Quote:
Originally Posted by JollyRoger
I would agree with you that the second day's battles on Little Round Top were significant to the battle itself and that is where one opportunity for victory was lost to the Confederates, but I must agree that Pickett's charge was the pivotal moment not only for the battle, but for the Confederacy itself.
If the show described the fence as "formidable", they are guilty of mischaracterizing it. It was only three feet high. The problem was, it slowed the infantry down just about the amount of time a trained man with a rifle takes to get a bead on a target, as they placed themselves up three feet higher as they scaled the fence. Being a stone fence, the low-explosive artillery shells of the day would have had little effect. But Civil War musket/rifles were not that accurate at 200 yards, so while the losses at the fence were severe, this was not the break point. As this study shows,
While everyone envisons Pickett's Charge as some sort of massive collision of infantry, which it was, it was primarily an action decided by artillery. The artillery barrage meant to soften up the Yankess was at the heart of their disaster. The fuses were defective, and the artillery spotters reported erroneous results. The Confederate shells were overshooting the Yankee lines, exploding harmlessly in the rear. The Yankee artillery, low on ammo and seeing no need for suppressing fire due the Confederate's poor aim, stopped firing, and it was this that would have horrible consequences for Pickett - the Rebs thought the Yankees had stopped firing because their batteries had been destroyed by the Reb's massive barrage, and it was in this mistaken belief that Lee based his decision to go ahead with the charge. As Tully's statements above report, and as shown by the measurement study I cited earlier, the result of that was a mass of crowded together Confederate infantry rising out of the Plum Creek depression into point-blank canister fire. They were shot to pieces.
But it is the long term effect that leads me to the opinion it was the central action of the battle. At the fore-front of the charge were the best captains, majors, colonels and mid-tier generals that the South could not afford to lose. Casualties among them were massive. The South never recovered from that.
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Its nice to get away from politics and find something upon which we generally agree.
The fence they were crediting with being the root of the disaster was the 5 or 6 rail wooden fence that ran along both sides of the Emmitsburg Rd. It was between 4 and 5 1/2 feet tall if the current reconstructions are authentic.
The artillery barrage was significant. Union Lt. Haskell in what has been called "the longest letter ever written", makes they comment that the union did not greatly fear the use of Artillery by the confederate as they generally cut their fuzes too long. He also records an impromtu luncheon on the backside of Cemetery Ridge near meade's HQ, just before the cannoade began. He says they were all just laying around resting after eating and there were 2 sharp canon shots and then the whole landscape erupted. The damage on the backside of the ridge was awesome. There are some reports that Lee believed that was where the Union reserves were massed. Haskell, along with General Gibbon went to the crest, and down the forward slope to get under the smoke and apparently had quite a good view of the proceedings. ( Haskell's account is a great read by someone who was right in the center of the point of attack. He was, in fact, for a time, the ONLY mounted Union officer at that point, and his work in rallying the troops was noted even by the Confederate officers. Haskell could write. His passion for the Union clearly apparent-he considered the confederates his misguided brothers. He never demeans the men of the Confederacy, but he has quite the scorn for the cause, itself. A very interesting first person account if anyone is looking for one.)
Totally ignored in the Military Channel's presentation was the defeat of JEB Stuart by Custer. Stuart's calvary was to cut the Union line from the rear as Pickett's pierced it from the front. They also failed to explain that Lee had tried both Union flanks, and Lee believed that Meade had weakened his center to provide those reinforcements ( partially true), and that would have left the center weak and assailable. ( Well, not quite.)