Only 99% of new voting machines say they're still voting Republican
 

:D

That's funny
How do you think future elections should be run? Do you think we should continue with the current punch ballots that many precincts use?

Peter

Oh man, that's a tough one. I've heard reports that more primitive style paper ballots like they use in France have advantages -- they do take longer to tally though.

Seems like the punch card ballots could have been improved. Perhaps if they had some sort of device that was mounted to the frame that would push an oval shaped plunger with sharp edges down through the ballot when the voter lined it up right -- maybe with a knob that you sorta punched downward. That would take some of the error out of the push-pin setup.

I think the paper trail from the punch card ballots is nice. That said, I have a hard time believing that any form of voting is 100% fool-proof (or should I say tamper-proof). In the past Chicago ballots have had a tendency to somehow "accidently" get wet and not register correctly in the machine.

The question really becomes - is it better to have a system with many human steps (i.e. punch cards where humans transport ballots, feed ballots into a machine), or is it better to rely on a system with only one "human" (software writers) involved.

I myself have no answer to this question, but minimizing vote tampering should be a priority in any case.

Peter

having no paper trail seems very perilous to me.

tom w

Finally, something we agree on! :) I agree that there should ALWAYS be a paper trail.

I'm not completely against the computerized voting machines, but I think there should be at least a "receipt printer", so that there's at least ONE "hard copy" of your vote.

Mike

i think this may be three times!

tom w

No matter what method is chosen, there will be an error rate. Nothing ever devised by the mind and hand of man has ever worked perfectly every time. I am certain I can safely say that nothing ever will.

The real question is, how much error can we live with? A corollary is, how much are we willing to spend for that level of reliability?

Let's say we want a 99% error rate. Does that sound okay? That means on average, 1 out of every 100 ballots is going to be rejected due to some sort of error. Should we halve the error and go for 99.5%? 99.95%? What if it costs twice as much for every incremental improvement?

Put another way, if elections were decided by a 10% margin we could easily ignore a 1% error rate. But when elections are decided by 1% of the vote, we better have a method that gives us 95% confidence at a 1% error rate or people will never cease believing that there's a conspiracy afoot.

Like we have nowadays.

B

and just because i am paranoid does not mean they arent out to get me.

tom w

I think touch screens may be useful, but ONLY as am assisit to marking a paper ballot. We used to have paper ballots that required the voter simply to complete the arrow to vote for their candidates. That was simple enough. A computer could be used to mark those ballots if some wanted the assistance. In any event, after marking the ballot manually, or having the computer mark it, the voter than reviews the paper ballot to make sure it is marked as they intended. After that, an optical scanner counts the ballots. The paper ballots are stoered for a possible recount. Low tech and reliable. Why was that system ever changed?

I heard that Diebold says their machines have a "recount capability"---the machine uses its own memory to print out "paper ballots". But since they are simply another presentation of the same invisible electrons they are not traceable. The machine simply continues to report the same data.

Paper ballots are pretty idiot proof, unless you bend, fold, staple, or mutilate one.

I'll be voting Republican right down the line.

I looked at the ballot the other day and they had some crazy parties listed...
1. Legalize Marijuana Party
2. Socialist Party
3. Libertarian Party
4. Poor Man's Party

:confused: :confused: :confused: :confused:

Who would ever vote for them?

I just received this e-mail from some anonymous e-mail address..

(These should be bullet points but they did not copy and paste)

Let me see if I understand the current situation with regard to using Diebold electronic voting machines and central tabulators in the November 7, 2006, election:
Many of the hard drives and apparently all of the motherboards of the voting machines are Made in China. China is known to be attacking Department of Defense, Commerce Department, and other government computers. Since the motherboard controls the voting machine, and hiding a malicious program in the boot sector of a hard drive isn't much of a trick, one has to assume that some or all of the Diebold voting machines are potentially, even probably controlled by China (Security 101). The only remaining question is whether they have exercised that control yet? Personally, if the option were mine, I'd wait until the 2008 elections.
Diebold voting machines are all based on one variant or another of the Microsoft Windows operating system. No other computer operating system in the world is subject to so many viruses, trojan horses, hack tools, worms, rootkits, or other attacks as Windows.
The voting machine does not have to be connected to the Internet to become infected with these agents. For one example see Tom Clancy's novel The Bear and the Dragon.
Diebold programming is primarily done in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, by individuals of unknown allegiance who are certainly not citizens of the United States or loyal to it.
Diebold has established a reputation for selling election "vaporware."
Diebold treats all software and hardware as proprietary so that it is impossible to determine what is actually used in an election to tabulate votes.
Logic and Accuracy Testing (LAT) is done in "Test" mode, not "Election" mode.
Central tabulation software, GEMS, is widely available on the Internet and step-by-step instructions on hacking the vote are posted. Whether this is the actual software used in a given election is impossible to determine as Diebold requires a non-disclosure contract and regards their software and hardware as proprietary.
Diebold uses Microsoft Access database to store election results with basically no security on the database.
There are no meaningful standards in place and the so-called "Independent Testing Authority" that "certifies" the voting machines is paid by Diebold and only tests what Diebold wants tested. And, if problems are found, they may or not be corrected.
What standards do exist permit wireless communication with the voting machines and Diebold is known to have implemented such methods in their voting machines in the past. A wireless link would be easy to include in the motherboard when Made in China.
Diebold has repeatedly used uncertified and untested software and hardware in elections, making a mockery of even the weak certification and testing procedures in place.
Diebold voting machines do not meet HAVA requirements for handicap access. The only handicapped they even try to assist are the visually impaired. Diebold paid one association of the blind $1 million to promote their voting machines. But when blind voters have used them in elections they haven't been real happy and to hell with any other handicapped voters.
Diebold voting machines have failed every independent security test ever undertaken by a number of nationally-recognized authorities.
Diebold has repeatedly failed to correct known security flaws and software bugs.
Attacks by a variety of experts have shown Diebold voting machines are easily hacked.
Standards for security of these machines has been demonstrated to be completely inadequate and unaffordable even if required by court order. So the argument that election processes and procedures "protect" them is fallacious. For example, every vote counting machine used in a precinct is sent home with an election judge from one day to a week before the election (known as "sleepovers").
Diebold hires technicians to support local elections off the street, does no background check, provides minimal training, and gives them unlimited access to the voting machines in most jurisdictions.
In many election jurisdictions Diebold personnel actually run the election.
Diebold TSx DREs with paper ballots must have the paper roll changed by a technician, not an election judge, every time 60-75 ballots are cast. The ballots are on a continuous roll and make a potential hand recount very tedious and time consuming.
"Programming" and machine errors have been exposed in every election cycle Diebold voting machines have been used in for the past ten years. Note that it is virtually impossible to distinguish "programming" errors from deliberate fraud or sabotage.
It has become easy to determine that a Diebold representative is dissembling. His, or her lips are moving.

I think you've got the right idea. Thinking is a pain in the a$$ anyway...

What kills me, Diebold was complaining that having their machines print a paper receipt would be difficult, might make the machines jam, etc. This from a company that primarily, I believe, manufactures ATMs, which seem to have no trouble dispensing a paper receipt. I've never experienced one jamming -- being out of paper maybe, but that could be easily dealt with by polling place staff.