Military voting pattern - PeachParts Mercedes-Benz Forum

Botnst · #1 10-24-2008, 01:01 PM

Not a random sample.

http://www.militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/081003_ep_2pp.pdf
http://elections.foxnews.com/2008/10/21/poll-troops-support-mccain/

SirNik84 · #2 10-24-2008, 02:04 PM

No surprise there.

Before this whole election started I was not a McCain supporter, but I've always thought he was a real war hero. plain and simple the guys a bad a$$.

cscmc1 · #3 10-24-2008, 02:11 PM

Not surprising in the least. That poll seems to reflect the mood among the military folks I know.

dynalow · #4 10-24-2008, 02:22 PM

No surprise here. I think AF voting will break 80/20 for McCain. At least.
Most of BO's supporters wouldn't think of being in the military-now or ever. (My gut feeling)

cscmc1 · #5 10-24-2008, 02:26 PM

The only moderately surprising thing, to me, is that McCain appears to enjoy even more support among Guard & Reserve components than active duty. One of the big gripes you hear from reservists is the life interruptions caused by activations (read: Iraq and Afghanistan).

pj67coll · #6 10-24-2008, 02:32 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by cscmc1

The only moderately surprising thing, to me, is that McCain appears to enjoy even more support among Guard & Reserve components than active duty. One of the big gripes you hear from reservists is the life interruptions caused by activations (read: Iraq and Afghanistan).

Never could understand where military volunteers get off griping about being activated. You don't want to go to war don't volunteer for the military. Seems pretty damm simple to me. That the military is likely to break for McCain isn't really surprising to me. It also equates pretty much with the, admittely few, military and ex military folks I know.

- Peter.

Medmech · #7 10-24-2008, 02:34 PM

The part that baffles me is McCains voting record on Veterans issues, all No or NV yet soldiers still support him, when I bring this issue up they are usually surprised.

cscmc1 · #8 10-24-2008, 02:51 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by pj67coll

Never could understand where military volunteers get off griping about being activated. You don't want to go to war don't volunteer for the military. Seems pretty damm simple to me. That the military is likely to break for McCain isn't really surprising to me. It also equates pretty much with the, admittely few, military and ex military folks I know.

- Peter.

It's somewhat common at my Guard unit. Granted, these are usually for TDYs to friendlier environs, but generally speaking, there are enough folks to volunteer for trips to offset the others. Furthermore, the ones who gripe are usually in for 4 years, collect the benefits, and separate. Anyone there for subsequent enlistments sticks around for more than the cash and benefits (imho).

Botnst · #9 10-24-2008, 04:07 PM

When did the military get the right to vote in federal elections? If memory serves me, at one time the military couldn't vote.

B

cscmc1 · #10 10-24-2008, 04:19 PM

Pardon the off-topic, but here's an interesting article on military voting during the Civil War:

Canvassing the troops: the federal government and the soldiers' right to vote.

Jonathan W. White.

Civil War History 50.3 (Sept 2004): p291(27)

Absentee voting by Union soldiers during the Civil War was a new phenomenon in American history. When the war began, only one state allowed soldiers to vote outside their election districts, but by the presidential election of 1864, nineteen northern states had passed legislation permitting their soldiers in the field to vote. (1) Nevertheless, historians have generally ignored this important political innovation. Only one monograph--written by a Union veteran--and a handful of articles has been published on the subject. (2) This lack of interest may stem from the fact that absentee voting is such a common occurrence today. Every state allows for absentee ballots, and in at least one state all voters are required to mail their ballots to local officials to be counted in the elections. (3) Today, most Americans are unaware that absentee voting has not always been an accepted practice.

When historians have addressed the question of the soldier vote in the Civil War, they have focused primarily on the partisan debates of the issue-the Republican support for permitting soldiers to vote and Democratic opposition to doing so--and that the army voted overwhelmingly Republican. Historians have overlooked the intricacies of this first large-scale instance of absentee voting. For example, scholars have very little idea of what polling in the field actually looked like. Moreover, historians have paid little attention to how the soldiers in the field were canvassed and how politicians at home took the ballot to them. (4) Examining this last issue reveals the extent to which the parties went to win elections. As the battle over Lincoln's reelection loomed in late 1864, politicians from both parties were willing to alter traditional understandings of the role of the state and federal governments to win the election.

During the presidential election of 1864, many state legislators and party leaders faced the unusual dilemma of determining how to take the ballot to voters beyond state lines. With soldiers from every state spread across the continent, this problem weighed heavily on the minds of politicians, and they found themselves unprepared for the task of canvassing the troops. They knew that the soldiers' votes were crucial to winning the election and that "hard work must be done" to secure them. (5)

This hard work was more than state and local politicians could accomplish on their own. Letters seeking aid flooded national party offices and federal departments in Washington. Under normal circumstances, local partisans oversaw all the happenings of election day, but with soldiers serving in every theater of the war, they had to look to national leaders for assistance. Consequently, Democrats from across the nation appealed to their party machinery in New York, while Republicans petitioned the federal government for support in turning out the army vote. Democrats often asked for pamphlets and ballots to distribute among soldiers, while Republicans requested aid in locating the troops and collecting their ballots. (6) As a result of these appeals, the federal government assumed unaccustomed responsibilities during the elections of 1864. When it came time for soldiers to vote, the Lincoln administration played a crucial role in ensuring that all of their ballots were counted, and when problems arose from the canvassing in the field, the federal government claimed jurisdiction over criminal proceedings that, under normal circumstances, would have been tried in state courts.

New York offers a particularly useful vantage point for exploring these important changes in the right of suffrage. The law passed by the New York legislature required soldiers to vote by proxy--that is, to mail their ballots home rather than cast them at polls in the field. This procedure opened the door to a unique type of fraud in American electoral history and presented the federal government with a new opportunity to regulate elections. As charges arose concerning frauds, the central question was one of jurisdiction. Members of both parties disagreed about whether the state or the national government should try the accused forgers. Moreover, New York offers an interesting case study because the Democratic leaders at the state level were also national party leaders. When local party operatives across the nation found themselves unable to distribute and collect their party's ballots among the troops, they turned to their leaders in New York. August Belmont, the party's national chairman, and Manton Marble, editor of the party's banner newspaper, the World, were both New Yorkers. New York's governor, Horatio Seymour, was not only the most prominent Democratic governor in the North, but also a possible candidate for the party's presidential nomination in 1864 and a vociferous opponent of Lincoln's war policies. Thus, as Republicans looked to the Lincoln administration in Washington for assistance, Democratic committees throughout the North turned to their party's leaders in New York.

Politicians in New York had started down a long and complicated path in 1863 when they began discussing whether soldiers in the field should vote. The debate in New York over permitting soldiers to vote mirrored those in the other Northern states. Republicans defended soldier suffrage on the grounds that soldiers, above all others, deserved the right to wield the ballot. They were "the flower of our population" one New York legislator announced in 1863. To deny them the ballot was an unjust act of "high-handed tyranny." (7) Democrats, by contrast, were wary of taking elections to the battlefield, where it would be difficult to protect the ballot box from fraud and where soldiers might be uninformed on current political issues. Allowing soldiers to vote when they were unfamiliar with the issues, or could be controlled by their commanding officers, would render them "worthless as soldiers and corrupt and depraved as citizens." Thus, despite the risk of appearing unfriendly to the soldiers, Democrats held firm against legislation permitting them to vote in the field. Soldiers, Democrats argued, should only be allowed to vote at home, in their own election districts. (8)

cscmc1 · #11 10-24-2008, 04:19 PM

Canvassing the troops, Pt. 2

Much was at stake in this debate. (9) Republicans were confident that if they permitted soldiers to vote, soldiers would gratefully elect Republicans to office. Democrats, while claiming to be the soldiers' true friends, argued that extending them the ballot would destroy free elections in the United States because it would place elections under the control of the president. (10) This partisan dispute illuminates Civil War politics. Because soldiers' votes could decide several significant contests, politicians developed carefully articulated arguments for and against soldier suffrage. These arguments reveal deeply rooted partisan ideologies as well as the practical influence of partisanship during a time of national crisis. Moreover, the debate over soldier voting demonstrates the extent to which the parties distrusted one another and the lengths they were willing to go to defeat each other.

Following the gubernatorial election of 1862 in which Horatio Seymour defeated Gen. James S. Wadsworth, New York Republicans concluded that their loss was a result of the absence of their party faithful who were dutifully serving in the army. (11) Republicans in the state legislature therefore pushed for legislation to enable soldiers to vote. New York's constitution enumerated several qualifications for voting that made such legislation difficult to frame. The constitution required a voter to be an inhabitant of the state and "a resident of the county where he may offer his vote" and also specified that he must vote "in the election district of which he shall at the time be a resident, and not elsewhere." (12) These provisions were obstacles to enfranchising voters away from home. Nevertheless, in early 1863 Republican newspapers and politicians commenced a crusade to enact legislation to allow soldiers to vote in the field, and the Republican-controlled legislature began framing bills to take the ballot to the army.

Early in the 1863 session, members of the New York state senate stated their intent to introduce legislation to extend the franchise to soldiers in the field. By April a voting-by-proxy bill had passed the senate and been submitted to the assembly. (13) On April 13 Governor Seymour sent an unsolicited message to both houses of the legislature criticizing the legislation they were producing.

Seymour challenged the constitutionality of the bill, pointing out that the state constitution required electors to vote in person in the election districts in which they reside. Because the soldiers' votes could decide the next presidential election, it was imperative to Seymour that the law guarded against fraud. The legislature could enact legislation protecting the ballot box while extending it to the soldiers, but only if the state constitution were amended. Moreover, Seymour asserted, it "would be worse than a mockery to allow those secluded in camps or upon ships to vote, if they are not permitted to receive letters and papers from their friends, or if they have not the same freedom in reading public journals, accorded to their brethren at home." If soldiers were uninformed on the issues, Seymour believed, they could not vote responsibly. Finally, soldiers must also be protected from "official tyranny," or the will of their commanding officers. "I have noticed, with deep regret, attempts on the part of some officers of the National Government, to interfere with the free enjoyment of their political opinions by persons in the army," Seymour wrote. Army officers had recently "been employed to interfere in the election of States in which they are not residents." President Lincoln himself could use the army "for electioneering purposes" to win additional terms in office. In other words, Seymour feared that those in control of the national government might interfere with the state-centered right of suffrage to sustain their own power. (14)

Republican members of the legislature responded to Seymour's message with anger and indignation. To address them before a bill had even reached his desk was "extra-official and unauthorized" and a violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers. Republican lawmakers believed Seymour's goal was not simply to oppose soldier suffrage but "to stimulate and encourage this lawless rebellion," divide and demoralize "sentiment at home,' combat the national administration, and "promote political conflicts" instead of patriotism. (15) To test the validity of Seymour's constitutional objections, the legislature inquired of the state's attorney general whether it was necessary to amend the constitution to provide for voting in the field. Daniel S. Dickenson, a War Democrat, replied that the proxy bill was not unconstitutional, though its mode of operation was "inconvenient, cumbrous and liable to fraud and abuse." The constitution required that an elector "must offer his vote," but this provision did not necessarily mean by the voter's own hand or in person, and there was nothing in the constitution "which prohibits the Legislature from prescribing such forms for depositing the votes of electors as in its wisdom it may deem best." (16)

By late April 1863 both houses of the legislature had passed the bill providing for soldiers to mail their ballots to be cast as part of the home vote. Because some legislators anticipated that Seymour would veto the bill, they also moved to frame an amendment to the constitution that specifically authorized soldiers to vote outside the state. A resolution to amend the constitution gained bipartisan support. Although most Democrats opposed soldier suffrage, they supported amending the constitution because Seymour had insisted that that was the only way soldiers could be given the vote. It would have been politically unwise for any politician to oppose a measure that would make it constitutional for soldiers to vote, and Democrats understood this. By the end of April, both houses of the legislature had approved a voting-by-proxy bill and also a resolution to amend the constitution. (17)

The proxy bill required each qualified soldier-voter to mail his ballot home and have it cast by an elector in the soldier's own election district. When Democrats objected to the proxy system, arguing that the constitution required citizens to vote in their own election districts and no where else, Republicans countered that the constitution "does not say that he must necessarily deposit the ballot with his own hand." The act of voting, according to Republicans, would take place when the ballot was physically deposited in the ballot box at home, and not when the soldier in the field sealed it in an envelope. "The agent who deposits it is a mere machine for that purpose," and the soldier "will not have voted until that ballot has been carried to his election district in this State, and is there received and deposited in the proper place." (10)

When the bill reached Seymour's desk he denounced it as "so clearly in violation of the Constitution" that it was "needless to dwell upon that objection to the bill." Seymour's veto message criticized the legislature for passing a bill that it knew was unconstitutional, as its own concurrent amendment to the constitution revealed. The governor was even more concerned about the "extremely defective and highly objectionable" procedures established by the bill. It placed the soldiers' votes not under the supervision of the state, but under "field officers of regiments, who have been recently brought within the operation of the most arbitrary rules of military government." In other words, the proxy system placed the soldiers' right to vote under the authority of the military (which was controlled by Lincoln), clearly violating the principle articulated by legal scholar Francis Lieber, that free elections must be "independent of the executive, or any other organized or unorganized power of the government" (19)

Seymour also believed that the bill would allow those in control of the federal government to perpetrate frauds upon the soldiers' votes. The national government had been allowing military officers to interfere in elections in the border states--"States of which they are not citizens"--and the government might also interfere when New York soldiers tried to vote. Furthermore, there would be few protections against tampering with the ballots while they were in transit to New York. Thus, this careless legislation might be "more disastrous to the cause of our Union than the loss of battles," Seymour concluded. "Such violent measures of partisanship weaken, divide and distract the people of the North, at the very moment they are called upon, without distinction of party, to make vast sacrifices of blood and treasure to uphold the Government." Unless the legislature passed a bill that conformed to the constitution, protected against fraud and coercion, and included provisions to punish those who defiled the sanctity of the ballot box, Seymour would withhold his signature. (20)

The Republican legislature failed to override the governor's veto in 1863, but in January 1864, hoping that the amendment would be ratified, it began consideration of a nearly identical proxy bill. By February both houses had approved the amendment to the state constitution a second time, and it was submitted to the people, who overwhelmingly approved it on March 8 by a vote of 258,795 to 48,079. (21) The amendment declared that in time of war, an elector serving in the military "shall not be deprived of his vote by reason of his absence from the state" and it empowered the legislature to determine the manner in which the soldiers voted and how their ballots would be returned to the state and tallied. (22) With the amendment adopted, Seymour had no constitutional ground on which to object to soldiers voting by proxy. When the legislature's new soldier voting bill reached his desk on April 21, 1864, he signed it.

cscmc1 · #12 10-24-2008, 04:20 PM

Canvassing the troops, Pt. 3

The New York legislature had accomplished a great feat in a short time: the mechanisms for soldiers to vote in November were now in place. The proxy law required each soldier to "authorize and empower any elector of the town or city" from which he was absent to cast his vote in his stead. This authorization was to be completed no more than sixty days before the election. Each soldier would prepare a document authorizing the elector at home to cast his vote, and this document would be signed by the soldier, a witness, and a commissioned officer from New York. The soldier would then enclose his ballot and the thrice-signed document in an envelope. On the outside of the envelope he would make out and sign an affidavit declaring himself to be an eligible voter from New York in the actual military service of the United States. The envelope would then be sealed and placed inside another envelope marked "Soldier's Vote," and the soldier would transmit the package "by mail or otherwise" to the elector he had authorized. The authorized elector at home could open the outer envelope (the one marked "Soldier's Vote") when he received it, but he had to leave the inner one sealed. On election day he would deliver the inner envelope to the inspectors of election at the polls of the soldier's election district, and the inspectors would check to see that the soldier's signature on the affidavit on the outside of the inner envelope corresponded with his name in the local election registry. If the soldier was listed, his vote would be "publicly opened" and cast in the ballot box. If the soldier's name did not appear in the registry, the inner envelope was to be left sealed and its contents rejected but retained and filed by the inspectors of election. (23)

The framers of the law established safeguards to prevent unscrupulous partisans from using soldiers' votes to manipulate the outcome of elections. Prior to an election, persons acting as proxies for soldiers were to sign receipts with the local postmaster declaring how many soldiers' votes they had received and would be depositing. Any inspector of election who refused to collect soldiers' ballots would be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by both fine and imprisonment, as would any person who attempted to forge soldiers' votes. Finally, the law required the secretary of state to see to the printing and distribution to New York regiments of the "blank forms and envelopes required to carry out the provisions of this act," thereby ensuring that all soldiers, regardless of party affiliation, had access to the mechanism for voting in the field. (24)

The statute left much of the process of canvassing the troops to the political parties. It made no mention of the distribution of ballots among the soldiers because the job of printing and circulating ballots at elections was usually the responsibility of the parties. It also placed no limitations on the parties in attempting to collect their own ballots. Soldiers could mail their ballots home individually, but doing so would be inconvenient. Thus, party operatives who were commonly known as "election commissioners" were employed to take the ballots to the field and then collect and send them back to their designated proxies in New York. (25)

As the presidential election of 1864 approached, the massive job of distributing and collecting the soldiers' ballots came to the forefront of many New York politicians' minds. (26) Under the terms of the law, Seymour was not required to supply the army with ballots; as a party leader, however, he decided to send Democratic tickets to the army. Seymour then made a seemingly nonpartisan gesture. He informed New York secretary of state Chauncey M. Depew, a Republican, that he would send both parties' tickets in the care of election commissioners appointed by both Seymour and Depew, if the Republicans would supply their own ballots. But Depew snubbed this offer--most likely because he did not trust the governor--so Seymour sent only Democratic tickets. (27)

Seymour advised Depew that he would have to take responsibility for sending Republican ballots to the field. "As the day for the election approaches, every delay becomes injurious to our soldiers, and as I have heard nothing from you, with reference to a co-operation in making such appointments [of election commissioners], I have selected several commissioners to proceed to Washington and the Army of the Potomac.... I have directed them to carry ballots for any parties, that may see fit to put them into their hands." When the Republicans rejected this offer to send ballots by election commissioners who would be jointly appointed by both parties, Seymour sent only Democratic commissioners, but he notified Depew that "I shall be happy to add others if you will name them." (20)

Striking about Seymour's offer to the Republicans is that he was a candidate for reelection in 1864. Seymour was offering to send not only Lincoln ballots to the field, but also the ballots of his own Republican gubernatorial opponent, Reuben E. Fenton. Also significant about this episode is that in rejecting Seymour's bipartisan offer, New York Republicans were choosing to rely on federal aid in canvassing the troops. "I will send [ballots] for both of the political parties," Seymour had informed Depew, "or if you prefer to send them [Republican ballots], I will give you any facility in my power." (29) But Republicans turned their backs on this state-level assistance and instead appealed to the Lincoln administration in Washington for the support they would need to ensure that New York's soldiers in the field received Republican ballots.

The Republican-controlled legislature made a considerable effort to win for soldiers the right to vote, but Republicans in New York were slow to ensure that their party's ballots reached the troops in time for the election. By late October they began to fear that their political allies in the army were unable to help reelect Lincoln, and they placed the blame on Seymour rather than themselves. "We are afraid there has been neglect to send Union soldiers' ballots to the army, with plain instructions how they are to be voted," worried the editors of the New York Tribune. Under these circumstances, "soldiers of decided Union preference may vote the McClellan ticket, rather than exclude themselves wholly from the right of suffrage." The Tribune charged that nine out of ten soldiers wanted to vote for Lincoln but could not do so because an unpatriotic governor had failed to send them ballots. The army was "flooded with McClellan votes," according to Republicans, because Seymour was acting not "as a trustee for all the soldiers of the State of New-York facing the enemy in the field" but only as an agent for the Democratic party. The following day the Tribune criticized Seymour for placing the responsibility of sending Republican ballots on the secretary of state, as he knew that Depew "had nothing more to do with the matter than any other citizen, and if he undertook to send ballots at all must do so at his private expense." The governor's goal, the Tribune concluded, "was, clearly, to escape the responsibility of sending ballots to Union soldiers." (30)

The Tribune's critique of Seymour was an understandably partisan assessment in the midst of an important campaign, yet the newspaper's complaint was inconsistent with the terms of the law, as well as with the actions of the governor. The legislature had made no provisions for the State of New York to supply ballots to the voters in the field. The state government was responsible only for printing and distributing the documents needed to authorize proxy electors at home, the two envelopes needed to carry the soldiers' ballots, and copies of the law. The state was not required to print and distribute election tickets. In the mid-nineteenth century political parties printed, distributed, and polled the ballots of their partisan supporters. The Republican editors of the New York Tribune therefore expected Seymour to do more than the law--and custom--demanded. The law did not require him to implement an impartial distribution of both parties' ballots to voters in the field any more than he was required to distribute Republican tickets to voters in New York. Seymour had offered to send Republican tickets to the field, but Republicans refused his offer. When he subsequently sent only Democratic tickets to the soldiers, he was acting as an agent of his party. That is precisely what he was supposed to be doing.

cscmc1 · #13 10-24-2008, 04:20 PM

Canvassing the troops, Pt. 4

The paucity of Republican tickets in the field may have been less the fault of Seymour than of Republicans in Washington. Because the responsibility for canvassing Republican soldiers fell to New York's secretary of state, Depew headed for Washington to consult with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. Depew later recalled making "my weary way every day to the War Department" to obtain information about the locations of New York regiments, but each trip was to no avail. "The interviews were brief and disagreeable and the secretary of war very brusque." Stanton refused to disclose the where-abouts of New York troops and thus risk giving "invaluable information to the enemy." Following one meeting, Depew complained to Illinois congressman Elihu B. Washburne that because of his troubles with Stanton, he must "report to the people of New York that the provision for the soldiers' voting cannot be carried out because the administration refuses to give information where the New York soldiers are located." Fearing that Stanton's non-compliance could lead to Lincoln's defeat, Washburne conferred with the president. An hour later Depew was informed that Stanton wished to see him. This time Depew found the Secretary of War "most cordial and charming." Stanton asked Depew what he desired, and Depew "stated the case as I had many times before." Stanton then ordered a subordinate to give Depew the information he needed in time for him to catch the midnight train to New York. "The magical transformation," Depew believed, "was the result of a personal visit of President Lincoln to the secretary of war." (31)

Democrats also had difficulty locating New York regiments in order to distribute ballots and collect the votes. In some cases they had to rely on information sent by Democratic army officers. For example, an unsigned letter from the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac found its way into the hands of the editor of the New York World. Enclosed was "a list of Penna., New York and Del. Regts. in the Armys opperating [sic] against Richmond[;] in case there is any other State that allows their Soldiers to vote let me know and I will try and get a list for you." The officer sent these lists because "we want some papers, tracts and so forth. The Repubs. are sending them down by the Wagon loads ... and not one yet for our side." He admonished New York Democrats not to "forget that we out here want some attention and that we are in want of as much attention as can be had--the other side is hard at work and so must our Side be or they will pull down our majority." This officer wrote anonymously because he did "not want to get in any trouble for sending" the lists. Like Stanton, he knew that divulging the location of troops may harm the Union war effort. (32)

With troop locations in hand, it became the work of the commissioners appointed by Seymour and Depew to poll the troops for their respective parties and ensure that their ballots were sent home in time to be counted in the election. During elections at home, members of both parties were present at the polls to protect against fraud. The party faithful stood by to challenge unqualified voters and prevent the other party from voting early and often. Because none of these circumstances pertained to elections in the field, some politicians feared that the proxy system allowed crafty politicians to manipulate the election results. "The method by which the soldiers' vote shall be sent in from the field," observed the New York Times, "seems very much like offering a chance to corruption." The Times concluded that "a citizen's vote [was] of less value than money," as it would pass through the malls more openly (in an envelope marked "Soldier's Vote") than any person would ever send valuables or cash. (33) Sure enough, in late October reports began to circulate in the press of an egregious wrong against the soldiers and their right to vote.

Two weeks before the presidential election of 1864 several Democrats from New York were arrested for allegedly forging soldiers' votes, first in Baltimore and then in Washington. The men were state employees who worked at the state agencies in those cities, not party-appointed election commissioners. The governor commissioned these state agents "for the purpose of giving aid and advice to the soldiers of that State whenever they may find themselves in need of either." This assistance included "clothing, tobacco, furloughs, promotion, intelligence from home," visiting the wounded in military hospitals, or ensuring that soldiers received their pay. As the elections approached, soldiers frequently went to the state agency to learn how they could vote and to send their ballots home. Because it was the general nature of the New York State Agency to aid soldiers in whatever they needed, it seemed logical that the party-appointed election commissioners should establish offices in its vicinity. Moreover, the state agents sometimes worked with the election commissioners to make sure that every soldier from New York who was eligible to vote could do so. The Democratic election commissioners occupied rooms at the agency in Washington, and Republicans had an office nearby in the city. (34) The men arrested in Baltimore and Washington were state agents, not the election commissioners appointed by Seymour and Depew.

In both cases the defendants were detained by army officers and tried before military commissions. Democrats protested the military assuming jurisdiction, claiming that the civil courts of New York were the proper place for a trial. Republicans, on the other hand, praised the swift actions of the military and hoped for harsh punishment. To many Northern Republicans these trials were of partisan importance. One Republican New Yorker took "pleasure" in the "prompt action of the Government against the traitors who have falsified the New York Soldiers votes." He assured President Lincoln that the trials were being "hailed with gratitude by all the loyal people of our State." If the military tribunals showed the "sternest justice" to the commissioners, then Democrats at home would be too frightened to cast the forged ballots at the polls on the day of election. Another Republican beseeched Lincoln not to allow his "kindness of heart to mitigate in the least the sentence of the scoundrels ... who will deprive the brave soldier of his dearly purchased & well deserved right to the exercise of the elective franchise." Still another Republican called for the fullest punishment under law if they were found guilty. Corruption must be rooted out of all levels of government for the sake of subduing the rebellion, he insisted. "If Jackson had hung Calhoun, my belief is, that we should have been Spaired [sic] this sacrifice of blood and Treasures." (35)

Republicans got their wish, and New York's Democratic state agents remained under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army. On October 26 Secretary of War Stanton directed Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday to proceed with the military trials of Edward Donahue Jr. and Moses J. Ferry, both held prisoner in Baltimore. They were charged with impersonating officers and soldiers in the army "and, in such assumed capacity, falsely and fraudulently signing and forging names of officers and soldiers in such service." Ferry pleaded guilty to only part of the charge, insisting that he had forged only some of the papers he was accused of having signed. Donahue, however, objected to being tried by a military commission and pleaded not guilty. He first sought the prominent Maryland politician Reverdy Johnson as counsel, but when Johnson could not be found, he telegraphed Peter Cagger of Albany and Sanford E. Church of New York City. (36) Both of these men were prominent Democrats in New York; Cagger was secretary of the Democratic State Central Committee, and Church had previously served as a lieutenant governor of the state.

Following the first session of the military commission, Ferry gave a confession in which he provided a detailed account of his dealings with important members of the Democratic party in New York. "It was agreed that we should sign the names of officers and soldiers, and then send them home to have the local tickets filled in," he admitted. "I made out such papers. I signed the names of soldiers on quite a number of them.... I did not sign the names of officers, but Donahue signed any quantity of them." (37)

The New York Times, under the headline "The New Conspiracy Against Our Soldiers," dubbed the Democrats' alleged actions the "depth of villainy ... beyond all previous conception." Seymour and the Democrats had done their "utmost to frustrate every measure enabling the soldier to vote." Not only had the governor vetoed the first suffrage bill in 1863, but the Republicans blamed him for insisting on a proxy system for collecting soldiers' votes. The Times conceded that "it is impossible to prove that his deliberate design, in insisting on that peculiar shape, was to defraud the soldiers," but "it has been converted to that end by the agents sent out under his authority." The "peculiarly framed law" had allowed Seymour's agents to substitute McClellan votes for Lincoln votes. (30) Of course, these accusations conveniently ignored the specific provisions of New York's constitution that required voters to cast ballots at their own election districts "and not elsewhere." Seymour was not responsible for the system of voting by proxy, as the Republicans charged; he merely insured that the legislation he signed conformed to the constitution.

cscmc1 · #14 10-24-2008, 04:21 PM

Canvassing the troops, Pt. 5

On October 28 Donahue's trial resumed. He had been unable to get Cagger or Church to come from New York to serve as his counsel, so he represented himself. He admitted signing fictitious names of officers on the documents authorizing electors at home to cast the soldiers' ballots, but he insisted that doing so was not a crime, because they were not the names of actual New York officers serving in the United States Army. He also continued to object to the jurisdiction of the military commission, claiming that civilians should be tried by a civil court. The judge advocate replied that New York's court system had no jurisdiction over crimes committed outside of the state and against those in the military service of the United States. (39)

As the case proceeded, the government called several witnesses. Orville K. Wood, who was in Baltimore as an election commissioner for the Republican party, had gained Ferry's confidence by pretending to participate in the fraud until he had enough evidence and an opportunity to expose the operation. Donahue objected that Wood's testimony was only about what Ferry had done, but the judge advocate replied that "the acts and admissions of one contributor bound the other, provided it was proof of the conspiracy." Wood described how the votes were forged, and he claimed to have seen legitimately cast Lincoln tickets replaced with McClellan votes. The next witness, Edward Newcomb, who had also been party to the fraud, further described the forging of election documents and the placing of McClellan tickets in unsealed envelopes. After Newcomb's testimony the government rested its case. (40)

Throughout the trial Donahue insisted that he had committed no actual crime because he had forged fictional names. More importantly, he continued to maintain that he should be tried in New York by a civil court and not by a military commission. As the case continued, however, Donahue became "visibly afflicted, appearing to realize for the first time the dangerous situation in which his acts had placed him." He acknowledged that his actions had been foolish and that he had no "knowledge or idea of the consequences." In desperation he appealed to the court for clemency on account of his youth and recent marriage, reminding the commission that he was not a professional politician. The judge advocate, feeling no mercy, gave a lengthy reply. "The enormity of the fraud is appalling," he argued, and "may well call for the severest penalty known to the court." The state agents had trammeled the "most sacred rights of the brave men who are absent from their homes periling their lives in the face of the enemy to uphold our liberties ... and fraudulent votes are sought to be given against the cause for which they have been periling their lives." Such action by "these plotters at home" was inexcusable, and "merits the extreme penalty of death" (41)

As the news of the trials in Baltimore and further arrests in Washington reached New York, Democrats reacted with outrage that their civilian state agents had been detained and convicted by military officials. Seymour complained both that he had not been told the reasons of arrest and that the arrests obstructed the soldiers from voting. He appointed several prominent New York Democrats to serve as agents "in behalf of the State of New York" to inquire into the more recent arrests in Washington. The agents were to take actions that would vindicate "the laws of the State and the rights and liberties of its citizens, to the end that justice may be done and that all attempts to prevent soldiers from this State, in the service of the United States, from voting, or to defraud them, or coerce their action in voting, or detain or alter the votes already cast by them in pursuance of the laws of this State, may be exposed and punished ... with all convenient speed." (42)

The agents, Amasa Parker, William F. Allen, and William Kelly, proceeded to Washington in late October to meet with the president and the secretary of war regarding the arrests of Col. Samuel North, Morven M. Jones, and Levi Cohn, all Democrats employed at the New York State Agency in Washington. They maintained that the state agents had not been charged with violating any federal law, but the New York state law that permitted soldiers to vote by proxy. The federal government, however noble its motivation in trying to prevent fraud, had grossly overstepped its jurisdiction. "These suspected and anticipated frauds have respect solely to the election laws of the State of New York," declared the agents, and "[we] protest against this jurisdiction assumed, as well over the alleged offense, as over the persons of the accused, who are citizens of the State, in its employ, and entitled to its protection." The government had therefore "greatly interfered" with the voting of soldiers from New York, and was depriving the state "of its proper jurisdiction over its agents and citizens, over offenses against its laws, and over its own ballot box, and the exercise of the elective franchise within its limits." In assuming jurisdiction over the cases, they argued, the federal government declared that the states were incapable of enforcing their own laws. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the soldier in the field votes, "if he votes at all, as a citizen of the State, and not as a soldier of the United States. For protection in his rights as a citizen, he looks to the State only." (43)

The Democrats successfully postponed the trials of North, Jones, and Cohn until after the presidential election by claiming the need for time to obtain adequate counsel. Republicans believed this was because of "the damaging effect which the facts developed by evidence will have upon the interests they represent." (44) Despite the partisan implications of the case, Stanton insisted that the trials of the New Yorkers were "strictly judicial, and, as far as I am concerned, partake, in no degree, of a political or party character." Furthermore, "they have been conducted with due regard to justice and all proper indulgence to the accused. There is no reason to doubt the trial will be fair, and that the conclusion will be the honest convictions of the judgment of the Court." (45) Stanton's nonpartisan language proved to be somewhat prophetic. The agents arrested in Baltimore were sentenced to life in prison (the sentence was commuted three years later), while those detained in Washington were acquitted. (46)

The cases received the attention of the uppermost officials of the federal government. Attorney General Edward Bates complained that "neither great principles nor great facts" were discussed at Lincoln's cabinet meetings, but only election matters--specifically, "the trials of Ferry and Donahue." Such distractions made Bates "wish the election was over." (47) Many other Northern Republicans were preoccupied with the trials and alleged Democratic corruption, and letters of concern flooded the executive branch in Washington. Before the canvassing of soldiers had even begun, one Republican complained of the "determination on the part of many Officers of our Army to control the soldiers vote for a party whose avowed object is the destruction of the Union." This correspondent wondered if Lincoln could do anything "to counteract the evil influence" of Democratic officers. (40) In September New York Republican leader Thurlow Weed warned Lincoln that Depew was "alarmed about the Soldiers Vote. The Law is loosely drawn, and he says that they can, with Democratic Inspectors here, work in any number of Fraudulent Votes." A month later Weed was confident that President Lincoln would win the election "unless the Fraudulent Soldiers Vote overwhelms us. I know that this is the only reliance of the Adversary." (49) And others lamented to the president that New York would go Democratic as the "frauds & the Demoralization through appointment of democratic officers in the Army have operated largely against us. (50) Even Lincoln's consul in Paris was informed by a personal correspondent that the president probably would win the day, though he may "lose [New York] through the fraud in the soldiers' vote." (51)

Because politicians of both parties perceived the votes of the soldiers as vitally important to the outcome of the election, they went to great lengths to win them. Carrying out the election and procuring the votes from the field was a time consuming and often frustrating chore, but both parties considered it essential. After rejecting Seymour's offer to send both parties' ballots to the field, Republicans looked to the federal government for assistance. Assistant Secretary of War Charles A. Dana remembered that the War Department was "busy in ... arranging for soldiers to go home to vote, and also for the taking of ballots in the army." The War Department's interest in the election was "almost painful," according to Dana. "All the power and influence of the War Department, then something enormous from the vast expenditure and extensive relations of the war, was employed to secure the re-election of Mr. Lincoln." (52)

cscmc1 · #15 10-24-2008, 04:21 PM

Canvassing the troops, Pt. 6

Although Secretary of War Stanton initially refused Depew the assistance he needed to canvass the troops, he took other measures to ensure a Republican victory. When Edwin D. Morgan, a U.S. senator and former New York governor, informed Stanton that quartermaster clerks were endorsing McClellan's election, Stanton dismissed twenty of them. When one of the clerks protested, an unsympathetic Stanton replied, "When a young man receives his pay from an administration and spends his evenings denouncing it in offensive terms, he cannot be surprised if the administration prefers a friend on the job." Democratic politicians, however, believed such actions were intended "to officer the Army as to bring the control of the officers over the men ... to influence their votes." (53)

The role of the War Department and the responsibilities placed on federal officials expanded in other ways because of the election. As a result, military personnel acquired intimate control over the process of electioneering. Although some officers showed little interest in election matters, the War and State Departments informed generals that they were required "to furnish passes and safeguards, and adequate escort and protection, to state election commissioners." Beyond these bureaucratic tasks, generals were also responsible to "furnish them necessary transportation, quarters, and subsistence, and every other facility essential." (54)

Though there were fewer voters in the navy, canvassing the sailors in the service of the United States was approached with the same urgency as the army. "I am so anxious about the Navy Vote," wrote Weed to Lincoln, "that I must annoy you a moment." (55) At the behest of Weed, Lincoln requested Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to aid in canvassing sailors from New York. When Charles Jones, the chairman of the Republican party in New York, called on Lincoln, the president sent him to Welles, who was ordered to aid Jones in "taking the votes of Seamen and Sailors." (56) The request irritated the secretary. Lincoln and Seward, he wrote in his diary, desired "one of our boats to be placed at the disposal of the New York commission to gather votes in the Mississippi squadron [and] the blockading squadrons." Welles facilitated the needs of the election commissioners but was unhappy with the inconvenience. Though "it seems ungracious to oppose" soldier suffrage, he confided in his diary, the "subject is one that has not struck me favorably." (57)

Canvassing the sailors proved to be intensely divisive. Politicians from both parties rushed to as many ships as they could, hoping to reach the sailors before their opponents. With blockaders patrolling the waters from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Mexico and Union gunboats cruising the Mississippi, canvassing the sailors became an undertaking of immense partisan importance. One Republican commissioner from New York stationed along the Mississippi regretted that his trip out west had been a failure. Seymour's commissioners had arrived ten days earlier to collect "the Votes here and then went on a Gun Boat for New Orleans Stopping all Boats they" met. (50) Along the Atlantic seaboard, however, another Republican New York commissioner had an easier time reaching the sailors. Sympathetic to this commissioner's cause, Adm. John A. Dahlgren provided him with two vessels for canvassing the sailors on the blockade as far south as St. Johns, Florida. Along the harbor in Beaufort, North Carolina, this electioneer also paddled "a small row boat from vessel to vessel" to collect the votes, though it was "very rough and difficult--if not dangerous--to get about as I have to do." (59) Electioneers, such as this boat-rowing Republican, were willing to go to great--even perilous--lengths to collect the votes of their party.

Civil War-era politicians were always looking for ways to increase the vote of their party, and many Northern partisans saw the extension of suffrage to soldiers as a means of gaining the votes of other disfranchised segments of society. Members of the Lincoln administration were most often asked if unnaturalized foreigners who were serving in the army, or had served previously, might be extended the franchise. One New York Republican had "several cases of this kind & whose votes are now in my hands from the army of the Potomac" and wanted to know of any relevant "Congressional Law ... as soon as possible." Others wondered if soldiers between the ages of fifteen and twenty could vote--an interesting question because young men were not allowed to enlist before their eighteenth birthday. And still others believed mechanics and laborers serving at military outposts, though not in actual military service, ought to be allowed to absentee-vote: "It is necessary to strain a point to make military and naval votes of these," wrote one election commissioner in late October. (60) In each of these cases, politicians seeking to broaden the franchise believed the basis for the right to vote was found in service to the federal government, not in state citizenship. Though the states only allowed voting by men aged twenty-one and older who were naturalized citizens, residents of an election district within the state, and in actual military service, some Republicans believed that adolescent boys should also vote even if they were not citizens, naturalized, taxpayers, or residents.

Partisan meddling with the qualifications for suffrage led many Democrats to believe that Republicans placed the interests of their party above that of the country. (61) Republicans easily countered that the Democrats had done the same thing in perpetrating frauds in the soldier's votes. Whether either party's accusations had any validity, the controversy over soldier suffrage reveals the deep partisan divisions of wartime politics. Perhaps even more striking, however, were the deep fissures within the Democratic party that the issue of soldier voting exposed.

The Democrats' national strategy--the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was--had become impractical by 1864 because of the Lincoln administration's policy of military emancipation. Even more damaging to their political fortunes, Democrats offered no effective military strategies for waging and winning the war. (62) Peace Democrats believed that war could not restore the Union. Party moderates preferred a peaceful settlement of the war through negotiation if possible but would settle for war if necessary. Though the two factions were able to settle on a compromise at their Chicago Convention in 1864, it was a losing ticket: a war candidate, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, on a peace platform with a Peace Democrat, George H. Pendleton, as the nominee for vice president. It offered the soldiers--and many civilians at home--the presidential candidate they wanted with a platform they "cannot swallow" and "never could digest." (63) Resourceful Democrats sought to remedy the situation by "getting up a 'war' record for Pendleton for the army," as well as "good McClellan military documents," such as his letter accepting the Democratic nomination for president in which he pledged further prosecution of the war. (64) But in the end, it was an uphill battle for Democrats to convince soldiers to vote for them after they had forced their presidential candidate to stand on a platform that declared the war a failure. Their ambivalent national strategy as articulated in their disjointed presidential campaign did as much as any Republican electioneering tactic to ensure Democratic defeat at the polls.