Those 16 little words

[KyGuy]

From today's WSJ-

Oh, wait, I forgot this isn't credible because the WSJ is part of the right wing media conspiracy!

ON THE RECORD

Saddam, Uranium and Africa
What two investigations say about Bush's statements on Iraq, yellowcake and Niger.

Thursday, July 15, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

From the "Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction" chaired by Lord Butler, published yesterday by the British House of Commons (a related editorial appears nearby):

493. In early 1999, Iraqi officials visited a number of African countries, including Niger. The visit was detected by intelligence, and some details were subsequently confirmed by Iraq. . . .
494. There was further and separate intelligence that in 1999 the Iraqi regime had also made inquiries about the purchase of uranium ore in the Democratic Republic of Congo. . . .

497. In preparing the dossier, the U.K. consulted the U.S. The CIA advised caution about any suggestion that Iraq had succeeded in acquiring uranium from Africa, but agreed that here was evidence that it had been sought.

498. The range of evidence described above underlay the relevant passage in the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on 24 September 2002 that: "In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although we do not know whether he has been successful."

499. We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government's dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush's State of the Union Address of 28 January 2003 that "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was well-founded.

500. We also note that, because the intelligence evidence was inconclusive, neither the Government's dossier nor the Prime Minister went on to say that a deal between the Governments of Iraq and Niger for the supply of uranium had been signed, or uranium shipped.

501. We have been told that it was not until early 2003 that the British Government became aware that the U.S. (and other states) had received from a journalistic source a number of documents alleged to cover the Iraqi procurement of uranium from Niger. Those documents were passed to the IAEA, which in its update report to the United Nations Security Council in March 2003 determined that the papers were forgeries. . . .

503. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:

a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.

b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible.

c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.

d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.

From page 46 of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee report published last Friday:
The CIA's DO [Directorate of Operations] gave the former ambassador's [Joe Wilson's] information a grade of "good". . . because the information responded to at least some of the outstanding questions in the Intelligence Community, but did not provide substantial new information. He [the reports officer] said he judged that the most important fact in the report was that Nigerien officials admitted that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Nigerien Prime Minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of foreign government service reporting. . . .

DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. They did not find Nigerien denial that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.