One of the many benefits of talking to the people who actually do the heavy lifting is that they are capable of providing a first-hand synopsis. Politicians hate it when the military talks to reporters.

The downside is that usually you don't get everything that the general may have said. You get what the reporter believes is important about what the general said. The reporter may think a lengthy, detailed, and confusing discussion of tribal politics and history isn't important while the general knows that an understanding of that dynamic is more important than knowing which cave Osama is hiding in.

A particularly instructive lesson that the USA failed to learn is the interaction between Special Forces (including all US and British SAS), CIA and the local tribes before the regular forces were on the ground. The war was nearly over BEFORE regular Army and USMC forces landed.

That method was wonderfully successful precisely because the CIA and SF took the time to build tribal relationships, speak their language and demonstrate to the locals their own commitment to those tribal leaders. That was exactly the model that was NOT followed in Iraq. Goodness knows why it wasn't. It would have saved billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives and we'd probably be withdrawing right now (IMO).

B