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cscmc1 · #16 10-24-2008, 04:21 PM

Canvassing the troops, Pt. 7

Both parties faced the daunting task of reaching the soldiers and convincing them to vote for their respective ticket. Both parties complained of the lack of ballots available for the soldiers, and both believed that enemy officers--that is, army officers from the other party--impeded the dissemination of political knowledge. "Maj. Hancock (brother of the General) tells us that the McClellan colonels destroy whole boxes of Republican documents sent to them," rejoiced one Democratic politician. "They do'nt [sic] allow the soldiers to see them." (65) Republicans believed this was scandalous behavior. The editors of the Tribune complained that the army was "flooded" with McClellan and Seymour ballots made to look like Republican tickets. (66) Yet Democrats also believed their voters in blue were being deprived of the information needed to make an educated decision. One Democratic congressman lamented to the editor of the New York World, "I despair of success, because of the soldier vote which is aloof from all social & political influences. We cannot reach it." (67) Democrats believed that soldiers could not vote responsibly because they were uninformed on the issues at stake and the positions of the various candidates. Seymour reported to August Belmont that many soldiers from New York and other states desired copies of the World and other Democratic papers. If Belmont "could furnish a quantity of campaign papers and documents for distribution to soldiers, from time to time until election day--much good would thereby be accomplished." (60) Democrats were convinced that Republicans "have flooded the army with campaign documents. We are doing nothing here in that line--and it must be done & everywhere." (69)

In order to canvass the troops and send political documents to the army, politicians believed they not only had to determine where the soldiers of their various states were located but also which officers in the army were sympathetic to their cause. Democratic politicians believed that political documents had to "be sent by express to some McClellan colonels etc. who will distribute them" because the "mail cannot be trusted unless papers are securely wrapped and directed to private parties" (70) Senator Edwin D. Morgan warned Stanton of a related Democratic effort to get "the principal officers in the Army committed to McClellan with [the] expectation of getting the soldiers votes." The Democrats had solicited Generals Joseph Hooker, William S. Rosecrans, Samuel Heintzelman, and even old fuss and feathers, Winfield Scott. "A committee went to West Point last night on the same boat I did to get Gen' Scott to attend their mass meeting and to preside at it. He thus far stands aloof. He thinks he should so stand throughout" Morgan knew that Scott was "not unfriendly to McClellan" and hoped that Stanton "will perhaps know all about the political preferences of the Generals whose names I have given and will know how to apply the remedy better than I do. Their object is to change the army vote." (71)

Democrats had nominated McClellan for president in part because they believed that he was their best hope for winning the soldiers' votes. Shortly after the general's nomination, the editor of the New York World advised him to refrain from writing political letters, but suggested that he might "keep up a diligent friendly correspondence with all your old friends in the army. You know the platform hurts us there, & how confidently Mr. Lincoln counts upon the ambition of the army officers & the votes of the soldiers to assist in his re-election." McClellan could counteract Lincoln's hopes just as Franklin Pierce had taken the vote of Mexican War veterans from General Scott "by private letters of a general nature" to old army officers in 1852. (72)

Many Democrats believed they had enough support from the voters in the North that they needed only "a fraction of the soldier vote" to win the elections of 1864. "If I have a fair response from my friends in the Army I can get through," wrote one congressman up for reelection in Ohio. (73) Democratic politicians believed that they would receive enough support from the troops, especially after McClellan issued his letter of acceptance pledging continued prosecution of the war. (74) Nevertheless, to many Republicans, any Democratic attempt to secure the soldier vote was treasonous and fraudulent. Secretary of State Seward was implored to "use every effort to preserve the integrity of the Soldiers Vote" as "frauds will be attempted & carr'd out if possible to elect the Democratic party." As Mark E. Neely Jr. has suggested, party competition in the midst of the Civil War was deeply factious, leading some politicians to think "only of electoral victory in the short term." (75) During the Civil War politicians of both parties--but particularly the Republicans, because they controlled the federal government--were willing to alter traditional federal-state roles and condemn party competition to win elections.

Despite his initial reluctance to help Depew locate New York soldiers, the secretary of war and the War Department eventually became central to the canvassing of the army. Republican politicians believed that Stanton had "it within your power to reduce the McClellan vote at least 10000 in New York," and appealed to him to "effect our redemption." (76) Stanton may have hoped to appear bipartisan--and he might have believed that he was--but it is little wonder that, under the War Department's election regulations, Democrats perceived Republicans as capable of dominating electioneering among the troops and suppressing pro-Democratic sentiment among officers. (77)

The War Department's orders made provisions for state election commissioners, party inspectors, and commanding officers to oversee the elections and distribute tickets. They forbade "political speeches, harangues, or canvassing among the troops." The orders also included a provision that anyone in the service of the United States "who may wantonly destroy tickets, or prevent their proper distribution among legal voters, interfere with the freedom of election, or make any false or fraudulent returns" was subject to military discipline. (78) Such stipulations could not stop corruption, however, and politicians from both sides protested instances of alleged injustice in the canvassing of the troops. "The soldiers were hungry for our tickets" one Democratic congressman from Ohio grumbled, and "the cry was for more, [but] the officers ordered us out! This in Columbus--a free state! Do you wonder how I am beaten. We left tickets there, when ordered out, but they were at once destroyed." (79)

Of course, the secretary of war cannot be blamed for this alleged illegal politicking. It was wartime, and party competition in the army was devoid of the safeguards of civilian elections. Both sides had partisan ends, and Republicans in the North were grateful to Stanton and the War Department for any contribution to their party's success. The Union State Central Committee in Pennsylvania unanimously adopted a set of resolutions stating how "greatly indebted to the War Department" they were "for the facilities it afforded the ... Committee in securing the soldiers vote at the October and November elections" (Pennsylvania held a state election in October). Therefore, "the thanks of the Committee are due and hereby tendered to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War for his cheerful and valuable cooperation in securing our triumph at the ballot box." (80)