Just finished Panzer Battles by Major General F.W. von Mellenthin. I have to say it was very interesting. He was a General Staff officer, but a middle manager during the war. So his point of view while more macro than say Hans Von Luck's who was a field commander, is not so macro like Guderian's that a lot of the interesting details are lost.
Another interesting thing is he relates to advancements after the war in both the political situation in Europe and tanks. He talked breifly about how tactics could change since modern tanks can fire on the move. He learned a lot from Rommel and made some good points, mostly about how to fight the Russians. For example insted of smashing into them head on, hit them hard from the sides. Pretty much don't fight when you can maneuver your enemy out of his position.
The Germans were extremely good at what they did. The Russians always outnumberd them, but they were able to operate and attack efficiently as long as they were only outnumbered about 5:1, and had good air support. Although far more unfavorable numbers were commen. As Mellenthin said he is doubtful that any other Western army could do much better against mass attacks.
He also brough up some interesting tactical points:
1. Never let a Russian bridge head last, attack with anything you have as soon as one forms. They will pour a never ending amount of reinforcements into it and within a few days no army on earth can dislodge them. One time his Panzer Corp, the 48th, almost got annihilated because they tride to encircle and cut off such a bridge head with a few very experianced but weak panzer divisons. They were able to, but as he said, "the ferocity of there counter attack took our breath away." AT that point they realized they had gotten themselves into some trouble. They had managed to encircle two Russian army groups and it took them about 12 hours for the Russians to figure out how weak the German forces around them were. When they did all hell broke lose. They 48th just managed to get away.
2. Never fight with a fixed defense, always keep it mobil. Hitler loved fixed lines but they were useless. Mellenthin prefered to use screens and mine fields as the front line, with the main forces out of artillery range further back, and the armour reserve concentrated even further back to fix problems. They used their artillery to break up Russian concentration points. He said many times in the book to keep your armour and artillery close so they can concentrate on one point. Using armour to hold positions is a waste.
Interesting book, I would recomend it. He isn't the story teller that Luck is, but its still a good read.
I could be wrong but I think thats Mellenthin, Model, and Manstein.