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Originally Posted by MS Fowler
Very disappointing show on Pickett's charge.
From what I have read and seen of the battlefield, this show was full of misconceptions and errors.
It follows the popular opinion that it was the pivotal moment of Gettysburg, while ignoring that the previous day's fight was the more significant one.--and closer to a confederate victory.
The show makes the point that the fences along the Emmitsburg Rd were too formidable of a barrier. That part might be true, based on what I've read.
That begs the question of why didn't Lee use his art'y to demolish the fences prior to the attack.
They ignore well-known data to make points of "new" information to solve the "mystery".
I guess the ruse worked; they got me to watch.
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I would agree with you that the second day's battles on Little Round Top were significant to the battle itself and that is where one opportunity for victory was lost to the Confederates, but I must agree that Pickett's charge was the pivotal moment not only for the battle, but for the Confederacy itself.
If the show described the fence as "formidable", they are guilty of mischaracterizing it. It was only three feet high. The problem was, it slowed the infantry down just about the amount of time a trained man with a rifle takes to get a bead on a target, as they placed themselves up three feet higher as they scaled the fence. Being a stone fence, the low-explosive artillery shells of the day would have had little effect. But Civil War musket/rifles were not that accurate at 200 yards, so while the losses at the fence were severe, this was not the break point. As this study shows,
http://www.gdg.org/Gettysburg%20Magazine/measure.html
due to the topography of the land and the flanking maneuvers of the Yankees "the point of attack was reduced to just 20% of its original length" as the study demonstrates, this compressed the Confederate line, putting this compressed mass of men within range of canister, as told by artillery Lt Tully McCrea:
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"On the 3rd [of July, 1863], during the forenoon, we could see the [Confederate] artillery going into position opposite us, and occasionally a battery would open on us to get the range, but two or three of our batteries would reply and stop it. It was, I think, about two o’clock, when they opened fire upon our corps, the 2d, with, it is estimated, two hundred guns. How they did put the shot in!
"We returned the fire for a short time, when we received an order to cease firing and shelter ourselves as well as we could. By drawing back the guns behind a slight knoll we could shelter the men and guns, but the horses were exposed, and it was by this artillery fire that we lost so many.
"If their artillery had been as good as their infantry, our loss would have been very much greater; but as it was, a large majority of their projectiles were too high. They kept this up for a time which seemed to us an age, but which was in fact between one and two hours. Their plan was to demoralize that part of our line; and as our artillery had not replied for a long time, I suppose they thought they had succeeded.
"As soon as their artillery fire ceased we were on the qui vive to see what they were then going to do. We felt sure that all this was to cover an attack at our point or at some other. Our curiosity was soon gratified, for out of the woods opposed to us a long line of "grey-backs," a brigade of them, advanced. They were halted and aligned. Then another brigade appeared behind the first, and a third behind the second; in all, as we now know from rebel sources, twelve thousand men, the flower of Lee’s army. Soon they advanced, and the famous charge of Pickett’s division began.
"We had, beside our artillery, but one thin line of infantry to resist this, and I thought that our chances for kingdom come or Libby prison were very good. But they had undertaken a very desperate thing. They had to cross an open plain and march twelve hundred yards to gain our position. There was no shelter for them other than a small orchard. A house and barn near the orchard had been burned the day before, and the skirmishers had thrown down the fences.
"A slight depression or valley was between their position and ours. Could a finer target for artillery practice be imagined? Three lines of infantry, two deep, advancing over such ground in the very face of our artillery.
"As soon as it was seen what was coming, a look of stern determination settled upon every man’s face, artillery and infantry alike. This was, it must be remembered, the afternoon of the third day, and every sneak and coward had found safe shelter in the rear long before. There were now there none but men determined to do or die.
"As soon as the rebel line advanced, all of our artillery, to the right, left, and front of them, that could be brought to bear, opened upon them. They soon discovered that we were not badly demoralized. Battery I, having smooth-bores, loaded with canister and waited for them to get nearer. When we opened on them one could see great gaps swept down. There were three lines, remember; it was impossible to miss. We had forty rounds of canister to each gun and they got the most of it. They marched bravely up in face of it all and part of them penetrated our line on the left of our position. But their number had then been so reduced that they could make no fight and were taken prisoners. Directly in front of where we were, when not fifty yards off, they hesitated and wavered. Then our infantry charged and captured the greater part of what was left. Gettysburgh [sic] – the greatest battle of the war – was there won. Lee had lost his Virginians, the flower of his army, and gave it up."
http://gfisher.org/Tully%20McCrea.htm
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While everyone envisons Pickett's Charge as some sort of massive collision of infantry, which it was, it was primarily an action decided by artillery. The artillery barrage meant to soften up the Yankess was at the heart of their disaster. The fuses were defective, and the artillery spotters reported erroneous results. The Confederate shells were overshooting the Yankee lines, exploding harmlessly in the rear. The Yankee artillery, low on ammo and seeing no need for suppressing fire due the Confederate's poor aim, stopped firing, and it was this that would have horrible consequences for Pickett - the Rebs thought the Yankees had stopped firing because their batteries had been destroyed by the Reb's massive barrage, and it was in this mistaken belief that Lee based his decision to go ahead with the charge. As Tully's statements above report, and as shown by the measurement study I cited earlier, the result of that was a mass of crowded together Confederate infantry rising out of the Plum Creek depression into point-blank canister fire. They were shot to pieces.
But it is the long term effect that leads me to the opinion it was the central action of the battle. At the fore-front of the charge were the best captains, majors, colonels and mid-tier generals that the South could not afford to lose. Casualties among them were massive. The South never recovered from that.
Last edited by JollyRoger; 01-19-2010 at 11:47 AM.
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