I fear propaganda less than I fear jihadi's. OBL was in Somalia and was one of the instigators of the coordinated escalation against US forces. I of course, reject your numbers as being misleading (probably unintentionally, but nonetheless).

Recall that there were numerous armed bands in competition for dominance over regions and even neighborhoods. OBL exploited that situation quite brilliantly and supported the bands most receptive to his Islamist goals. Somehow GHWB confused the insurgent Islamist problem with the starvation problem and sought to address both simultaneously. In hindsight this was a bad mistake, if for the right reasons. 1) Helping a predominantly Muslim country that was unable to feed or govern itself and 2) thwart OBL's radicalization of the problems in Somalia. The result was that the military had a role for which it is unprepared--conflation of the humanitarian and military missions.

Clinton (in the person of his DoD Sec, Les Aspin) received a bad hand and made it worse by equivocating. He sent in a more powerful military presence while restricting their rules of engagement even more. The military was sent into a hostile situation with insufficient manpower and material and with bad limits on what they (the military) could do. The military did it's duty magnificently. Brave, determined men were shot to pieces needlessly but with uncommon bravery and skill. The brought well-deserved honor to themselves. But it was all a terrible abuse of our soldiers.

In hindsight, that most marvelous of tool, the forces sent in at the outset were sufficient to the task and should have remained as a garrison force to protect NGO's--their original mission. But mission creep occurred. Also, instead of sending uniformed military on patrols the CIA should have been cut-loose to do their thing through the rich sources of surrogates. But in Clinton's defense, his administration was still overly burdened by the restrictions against covert and clandestine operations by the excesses of the Church Law. OTOH, Clinton's administration at that time was rather contemptuous of both the military and intel communities, so I doubt his administration made much effort to get Congress onboard with a change in the Church Law.

It was a bureaucratic perfect storm paid in the usual price--the blood of good men.

Another result was convincing OBL that the USA, like the USSR demonstrated in Afghanistan, could be defeated through bloody violence and media manipulation.

B

So, would a correlary lesson learned here be to allow the military to run the show in theatre rather than the politicos?

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At this time, for sure. But in the beginning I think that DoD chose the easily understood model for military victory--blitzkrieg. And it worked magnificently. But the aftermath has been bad and worse, I don't think it could have been done better, given the military model they used to start with.

They should have done like they originally started doing in Afghanistan--let CIA and SF do their thing. Destabilize the threats and work with improving the weapons, tactics and political solution with the tribes on the ground. Too late for that in both countries, I think. Unless we got really radical and dramatically shifted the force structure, disposition, tactics and strategic goals.

well, I was musing on Somalia and what difference there would have been if any, if the military was let to deal with the situation without interference from the executive branch.

But, just as appropriate to wonder about current affairs.

With regard to tactics, training and weaponry. Does the CIA take this role in a conflict when we are looking for little official "participation"? When we are there in great numbers is this role more appropriatly given to line troops so the CIA can focus more on information?

How does an outfit like the CIA work in a country like Iraq? We've got very little in the way of well embeded undercover operatives there due to the nature of the society and the shortcomings in arabic resources for the CIA and it is by nature, a somewhat insular society.

As for SF, I'm wondering if we would really hear of their successes until much later - if they were succesful. It's very rarely mentioned if there is involvement of SF in the capture of so-and-so and what-not; which is appropriate, I think.

What would a radical change look like?

Just some assumptions, right or wrong, on my part and some questions.

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CIA uses covert and clandestine people, weapons and tactics. The regular military and most politicians don't like it in a large degree due to it's avoidance of the Geneva Conventions. Also, the command and control is so decentralized that light colonels and majors often have virtual autonomy. Imagine if that awful movie, Apocolypse Now, had been done in a the fashion of "Blackhawk Down." Kurtz (was that Brando's character?) would have been a hero and we'd never have known. But it also carries the danger of a wacky guy like Kurtz seizing actual control.

The people who are in the covert and clandestine business are some of the finest specimens of manhood I've ever met. They are the type of guy who you meet and immediately think pretty highly of. They are obviously competent and charismatic--but not in the sense of a politician or religious leader. If you haven't met competent military leadership then it's difficult to explain. And those guys are often the cream. Sort of like a Nietsche or Dostoeyevsky or Ayn Rand type character.

And that's why their darkside is so damned dangerous to civil society and why the Founding Fathers were adamant that civilians must control the military. You can never let those guys run the government.

It's the paradox of the perfect weapon.

B

James McMurtry said it best:

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But of course. Give them a task and NO INTERFERENCE, NO MICROMANAGEMENT, NO POLITICOS. How they do it is their business. How many soldiers, how much equipment and what they do is up to them. Their business is to defeat Hussien and restore order not to do much else.

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The problem is that they are telling the military how to do everything from weapons to buy all the way to how to fight. It is like hiring a garderner and telling him how to dig, with whichever hand and what brand and type of tools to use. Just tell him where you want the plant to be and leave him to do his work. Maybe not a good example but I am against micromanagement.

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I'm happy with the way this country places a civilian in charge of the military, ultimatly. It is the sanest way to govern. I was more thinking that a regional campaign would better be run by a military head without undue interference by politicos from thousands of miles away. All autonomy has limits; in this country at least.

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-livin' in the terminally flippant zone

Yeah, I agree. But I believe that the current strategy, particularly in Iraq, may have run it's natural course. It maybe that more delegation of decision-making might bring more force into a situation in which additional force may not be the best tool for long-term stability.

I am increasingly of the opinion that the Administration needs to get a top-down detailed assessment of their strategy and force distribution from folks outside of DoD that have a wide background on military and intelligence. If at all possible it should be kept secret. Why secret? Because the President needs clean, unrestrained analysis and conclusions from which to establish policy. And if he chooses to modify or not implement portions he shouldn't have a mouthy bunch of back-benchers using his decisions for their own purposes. That kind of deliberation is best conducted in and by Congress. Congress must be political in nature.

Concomitantly, a publicly held Congressional review would be useful. This gives Congress (and voters) a buy-in for a review. No, I don't me a showboating review. I mean one perhaps like the 9/11 Commission. Credible people given wide discretion.

And since Congress holds the ultimate power, it really wouldn't much matter what the secret panel recommends to the Administration. The Administration would still have to convince Congress of it's plans.

I think something like the top down review may be happening. James Baker was recently named as an advisor. His views on the subject of Iraq differ diametrically from previous advisor's. It seems it will be an interesting couple of years coming up in this area. I don't know if Baker will make any difference/change, but it indicates an openess to reevaluation.

I'm undecided on the public review. I'm not sure what the value added of that would be. Either you succeed in Iraq or you don't. Success/Failure is prima facie based on the outcome.

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I read about the Baker involvement after I wrote my opinion. I think that is exactly the right thing. Baker is one smart mofo and has absolutely nothing to lose and much to gain (in terms of history) for being honest and discreet.

Concerning public review, I think your proposition presents a false dichotomy about Iraq. I believe there are likely to be a large number of outcomes varying from a miraculous blessing of God Almighty to a Satanic possession. In between we have the multitude of human-created alternatives varying from somewhat hopeful to a freaking world-shaking disaster. To me, somewhat hopeful is worth just about any price in money and blood. I am well aware that mine is a minority opinion, but there it is.

Concerning a public review: That is who we are, a representative democracy. If we cannot trust the institutions of government that define the American experiment, then the experiment has failed.

Bot

Maybe I'm in the minority as well, although I think more realize this than admit. I've always seen tremendous strategic and political importance in Iraq. In fact, it was one of the few, if not the one place that met several criteria early on with regards to the current struggle civilisation finds itself in. I agree, there are many shades of success in which Iraq would prove very useful to the western world and itself regarding the above struggle.

I don't discount a public review but in the current environment it would be nothing but a circus for the extremists. What would we learn from it? Maybe a review would be better done in two or three years. Still from an impartial board. I would think that may almost be a neccesity at that time as we'll have to figure out which direction in which to head at that point and I don't see things being over and done with anytime soon.

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people can be fair and not be impartial. For example, I could serve on a jury involving OJ Simpson and I am reasonably certain that I could separate my opinion concerning OJ from some legal accusation.

In the same sense, I believe that the Congress is capable of rising to the occasion when the occasion warrants. They can also fall short--there are no guarantees. But failing to take the risk is an admission that representative democracy cannot work.

The fundamental assumption of compromise in a democracy is that reasonable people can disagree. If that assumption is no longer tenable, then neither is democracy.

Bot

That's a pretty good analysis.

Of course I'm only guessing on the numbers. I think, though, that we overestimate what our military can do in anything short of full on mayhem, a la WW2. Our helicopters would blow the roofs off of those shanties while looking for suspects.

The longer we stayed, the more resistance we would have encountered IMO. And supposedly the Somalis lack everything but guns and ammo. I've read they're almost the most armed country on earth, at least in terms of everybody and his brother having an AK 47. I think the fighting could have easily escalated with caualty numbers going up steadily.

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