Sorry, I tend to run on about Gettysburg and Civil War.

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1982 300SD " Wotan" ..On the road as of Jan 8, 2007 with Historic Tags

Actually the pivotal moment was when Lee disregarded Longstreet's advice to fight a defensive battle to the south and east of Gettysburg where the Confederates controlled the high ground.

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1983 300SD "Guderian"
1987 MR2
2015 Camry
2015 Chevy Spark
2006 Hyundai Tucson

No, the Google map I posted in an earlier link:

http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl&q=gettysburg%2C%20pa

Rome controlled it's Empire because of it's strategic road system. IMO, Lee intended to do the same from Gettysburg. The Baltimore Pike, called "the National Road" in it's time, controls the Cumberland Gap:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Road

In addition, check out this map, you will see the existent roads, one rail line goes right into Philidelphia passing Harrisburg, and then a short march up to New York. Note a second railroad line running into Chambersburg, coming up from Hagerstown, a few miles from Virginia. Note the topography around G-burg, flat, agricultural:

http://www.mapsofpa.com/19thcentury/1866mcnally.jpg

Is it any wonder Lee marched first to Chambersburg, secured it, and then on to Gettysburg?

The book is in error. Washington was too well defended for a direct attack. So was Richmond. Lee intended to do just what Sherman did, burn everything else but.

I think you have Antietim mixed up with Gettysburg. Up until the Battle of Antietim, there was a lack of Union victories, and it ended as a draw much like you describe. Gettysburg was certainly no "draw". Having one's best division shot to pieces and being forced to withdraw after being mauled is hardly a "draw". Lee was never able to use his army as an offensive weapon after that point, other than the cavalry raids of 1864 as mention by MS. It's best men and officers were lost, it's artillery abandoned in haste - it was a resounding Union victory, the problem was it was a victory Meade failed to take advantage of, as you mention. And prior to the battle, the Union had had a number of victories, mostly in the West, but it had also carried out a number of successful naval operations and coastal invasions in the East. But Yankee civilian morale was falling, because Robert E. Lee seemed indefeatable, and the war could have just been easily lost politically on the home front at that time as it could have militarily - Gettysburg put an end to that.

Grant and Lee were the world's preview of World War I, trench warfare, staggering casualties, with the emphasis on war being a contest between armies who slugged it out from behind defensive positions. Sherman was the world's preview of World War II, emphasis on mobility and manuever, and war being waged as much against the enemy's civilian population as it was a contest of armies. Gettysburg was the last gasp of Napoleanic War tactics. The rifle ended the massed infantry charge once and for all.

"Last of the Rebels"....Here is some useless trivia. Scroll to the short HISTORY section. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Town_Line,_New_York

I may have mentioned this before, my grandfather made his living as an antique dealer and was an expert on Civil War and Revolutionary War artifacts of some repute. In his day, war antiques were acquired by going to the battlegrounds and digging them up, so his knowledge of Gettysburg was immense. A number of his finds were displayed at the Harvard Museum for quite some time, altho sadly, most of them were auctioned off at Christie's upon his death. I inherited his book collection, containing many of the "first person" accounts of which you spoke, it is one of my proudest possessions. I am grateful for the knowledge I gained from him and his introduction of the topic to me in such away that I have made it a hobby all my own life. So I too, tend to go on and on.

Ahh the myth of the lost cause.

It is true that both armies fought better on defense than offense, so anytime you could coax the opponent to attack you in land of your choosing was good.
However, the idea from Longstreet that he could just swing around the Union left and get into their rear is, IMO, a myth.
At the time of his early recon ( by Alexander, IIRC), that might have been true, but by the time any attack could have been mounted, it would have run smack into Union forces coming up the Baltimore Pike, and likely would have been also attacked by the Union reserves that were behind the Round Tops. Besides, the ANV was in enemy territory, and without supply trains. It would have been forced to forage for food. Meade could simply surround them, and wait until they starved, or attacked him in his prepared positions.

Its grand to think thru these ideas, isn't it?

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1982 300SD " Wotan" ..On the road as of Jan 8, 2007 with Historic Tags

I would be interested in hearing your opinion on the historical accuracy of the Ken Burns Civil War series. (I guess it's 20 years old now)
And yours as well, MS.

The fellow who could have swung around and attacked the Union rear was dead. IMO, the thing that really lost the battle for Lee was the absence of Stonewall Jackson. Anyone reading the accounts of the battle on the Southern side will find that Lee had a vague way of issuing orders, which worked extremely well when given to a subordinate like Jackson, who was willing to fill in the blanks with his own ideas, ideas that usually resulted in a lot of dead Yankees. While Lee was vague, Jackson, the stern school teacher, issued order after order exemplar in their exactitude, demanding they be carried out to the letter, and those who failed to do so, were often shot. No two men showed how much opposites working together are often the strongest teams. Lee, the strategic genius who could hardly bear the suffering of his men, Jackson, the tactical genius who only cared for absolute success no matter the cost. Lee, the melancholy depressive heartbroken by the brother's war who soldiered on out of duty, and Jackson, the angry avenger of the South, the high priest of war who prayed for nothing more than his enemy's death and reveled in their slaughter.

Unfortunately, men of Jackson's calibre are not found every day, the rest of the Southern generals would take the vague orders and interpret them in ways that they played politics with or minimized casualties in their own commands by not taking risks. Not only that, Lee's opinion of Longstreet's fighting ability was very high, but his opinion of his tactical planning skills was not. If it had been Jackson who had said to Lee 'don't attack Cemetary Ridge, do this instead', that is what would have been done. But it was not. The success of the South prior to Gettysburg was due to the interaction between these two men - Stonewall and Lee, as much more than it was Lee's personal genius alone. The South, out numbered, out industrialized, out financed, had the luck of producing the two greatest military geniuses in US history, at the same time. With them, they could not be defeated. Absent one or the other, they were doomed.

Well said!
I would also offer that the early sucesses of Lee/Jackson occured when they were on the defensive. They also occured when they faced seriously inferior generals. The North had nearly ALL the bad ones. Who else but McClellan could find Lees orders, indicating he had divided his forces, and be happy that he came away with a "draw"? Lee KNEW McClellan would delay, and that delay was the edge Lee needed to get his troops together--in the nick of time. Poor old Burnside---fighting for hours to get across that stupid bridge, ignoring fords and other alternatives, and then just as he drives the confederates, has the luck to have Jackson((?) arrive from Harpers Ferry, and immediatley on his flank. Then the Union leadership rewarded Burnside with command of the whole army which he delayed into defeat and slaughter at Fredricksburg.

I agree with you that Lee and Jackson were perhaps the two best generals ever in the USA. But, seriously, how good did they have to be against McClellan, Hooker, Burnside, etc.
Don't EVEN mention that commander of the 5th Corps (?) at G-Burg, who named himself the savior of the battle, but should have been court marshalled for incompetence. Too bad that he only lost his leg!

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1982 300SD " Wotan" ..On the road as of Jan 8, 2007 with Historic Tags

I think history has been much too kind to Lee as a brilliant general, and much too hard on Grant as a general who succeeded only because he realized he could sacrifice his own men due to the North's superior numbers.

I think if any of us can recall what we learned about U.S. history in high school is that Lee was a genius and Grant was a butcher and slaughterer of men, who won only because he had superior numbers.

I have read at least two biographies of Grant and his autobiography.

Grant was surely the antithesis of Lee in nearly every way. He did not look the part of a general. He was slight in stature, dressed modestly, quiet, and inarticulate. He was also uniquely non-academic, thinking in facts and not theory, and completely oblivious to his own genius.

What separates Lee and Grant the most, though, is Grant's ability to see the "big picture". Lee was undoubtedly the better tactician by far, but he was not a strategist. He failed to see that the South's best hope for survival was to hold out. Lee’s offensive tactics ensured the Army of Northern Virginia sustained greater casualties than it could afford. Had he fought defensively most of the time, Lee would have saved soldiers who could fight again, perhaps outlasting the North’s will to win.

As a tactician, Grant was horrible. He favored the frontal assault, and lost large numbers of men at Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, and Spotsylvania, to name a few. He never learned that frontal assaults would no longer work.

His Vicksburg campaign was brilliant, even though the battles were won in a pedestrian manner. He outmaneuvered his opponent and prevented him from combining forces. As commander of all the armies in 1864, Grant understood two aspects of the war that those before him did not. First, the North had to keep pressure on all of the South’s armies simultaneously to keep the Confederacy from using its interior lines of communication to shift forces quickly. Second, he realized the North had greater manpower and could replace its losses more easily than the South. If he kept pressure on Lee’s army and kept it fighting, eventually Lee would run out of men.

So if Lee is the better tactician and Grant is the better strategist, does this make them equal, or can it be argued that one is the better general?

Grant must be seen as the better of the two. No man, other than Lincoln, did more to win the war than Grant. His strategic vision enabled him to maximize his advantages and Lee’s disadvantages. He forced Lee to fight and continue fighting without rest. Grant could replace his losses, Lee could not. As a result of Grant’s strategic talent, the Army of the Potomac was able to do the one thing Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia could not – win the war.

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Paul S.

2001 E430, Bourdeaux Red, Oyster interior.
79,200 miles.

1973 280SE 4.5, 170,000 miles. 568 Signal Red, Black MB Tex. "The Red Baron".

The North's great generals appeared late in the war. Sheridan, Sherman, Custer - Grant was very good at choosing the right men for subordinates. Sherman was a better field general than Grant, Custer inspired his men more, Sheridan knew how to move on the battlefield better, Meade was a better field commander. Grant's genius was in staying out of their way. You are right, when he actually took command, the slaughter was usually incredible among his own men. Cold Harbor says it all. Senseless, and so Grant.

One of my favorite Grant quotes is one where a newspaper reporter asked Grant what his strategy was to end the war. "I only have one strategy", Grant said, "Hammer, Hammer, Hammer!". So I really do not know if I agree that he was a great strategist, that would be like saying the man beating his opponent with a sledge hammer had a great strategy for winning. I suppose.

Yeah, Cold Harbor was the bad one. Completely indefensible.

I remember reading in his autobiography that this was the only attack he wished he had never ordered.

Another thing I recall about Grant as a general is that he possessed a photographic memory of maps and terrain, and would write very detailed orders to his subordinates and field officers, all from memory.

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Paul S.

2001 E430, Bourdeaux Red, Oyster interior.
79,200 miles.

1973 280SE 4.5, 170,000 miles. 568 Signal Red, Black MB Tex. "The Red Baron".

...when he was sober.

Sherman's Autobiography was much more readable. One of the best military writer's I've ever read.

I didn't know that Sherman wrote an autobiography.

I'll have to see if amazon.com has it.

Edit: Eureka!! There's a Kindle version available for $0.99. Must mean the copyright has run out.

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Paul S.

2001 E430, Bourdeaux Red, Oyster interior.
79,200 miles.

1973 280SE 4.5, 170,000 miles. 568 Signal Red, Black MB Tex. "The Red Baron".