The Moussaoui Myth



One of the big arguments advanced by the right is that Bush’s warrantless domestic spying program could have prevented 9/11. The Washington Post gave Bill Kristol and Gary Schmitt space to make this argument on December 20:

Consider the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the French Moroccan who came to the FBI’s attention before Sept. 11 because he had asked a Minnesota flight school for lessons on how to steer an airliner, but not on how to take off or land. Even with this report, and with information from French intelligence that Moussaoui had been associating with Chechen rebels, the Justice Department decided there was not sufficient evidence to get a FISA warrant to allow the inspection of his computer files. Had they opened his laptop, investigators might have begun to unwrap the Sept. 11 plot. But strange behavior and merely associating with dubious characters don’t rise to the level of probable cause under FISA.

One problem: Kristol and Schmitt are completely wrong. Coleen Rowley, a former FBI agent who testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2002, wrote into the Washington Post to correct them:

[N]o evidence of Moussaoui’s suspicious flight training and ties with terrorism was presented to the Justice Department. The department was never contacted and so did not decide anything; therefore, no decision was ever made regarding the given evidence and its subsequent application to FISA standards.

That means the FISA procedures were not the reason the FBI failed to inspect Moussaoui’s computer files. Rather, the FBI’s failure to share and analyze intelligence sufficiently is what enabled Moussaoui to escape further investigation.

Kristol and Schmitt conclude their op-ed sanctimoniously: “to engage in demagogic rhetoric about ‘imperial’ presidents and ‘monarchic’ pretensions, with no evidence that the president has abused his discretion, is foolish and irresponsible.”

The law, even for the President, is not discretionary. What’s foolish and irresponsible is to use phony evidence to advance outlandish claims in one of the nation’s most widely read newspapers.

Pity reply

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Oh, it's ok, you can still be an apologist

Your bait is old and stale. :trollblocked:

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1989 300 SEL that mostly works, but needs TLC

THe myth is that you have a clue Charlie...

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"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you." - Friedrich Nietzsche

What flavor of that kool aid have you been drink'n?

'Able Danger' had Atta under constant surveillance. Had the legalities of surveillance not come up, there would have been no WTC attack because the operational cell would've been captured and interrogated before 09-11-01, as the intel from that operation was crystal clear about what they were up to. Clinton decision making at its best.

According to the memorandum for the record on this meeting, prepared the next day by Mr. Snell, the officer said that ABLE DANGER included work on “link analysis,” mapping links among various people involved in terrorist networks. According to this record, the officer recalled seeing the name and photo of Mohamed Atta on an “analyst notebook chart” assembled by another officer (who he said had retired and was now working as a DOD contractor).

The officer being interviewed said he saw this material only briefly, that the relevant material dated from February through April 2000, and that it showed Mohamed Atta to be a member of an al Qaeda cell located in Brooklyn. The officer complained that this information and information about other alleged members of a Brooklyn cell had been soon afterward deleted from the document (“redacted”) because DOD lawyers were concerned about the propriety of DOD intelligence efforts that might be focused inside the United States. The officer referred to these as “posse comitatus” restrictions. Believing the law was being wrongly interpreted, he said he had complained about these restrictions up his chain of command in the U.S. Special Operations Command, to no avail.

The officer then described the remainder of his work on link analysis efforts, until he was eventually transferred to other work. The officer complained about how these methods were being used by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and mentioned other concerns about U.S. officials and foreign governments.

At the time of the officer’s interview, the Commission knew that, according to travel and immigration records, Atta first obtained a U.S. visa on May 18, 2000, and first arrived in the United States (at Newark) on June 3, 2000. Atta joined up with Marwan al-Shehhi. They spent little time in the New York area, traveling later in June to Oklahoma and then to Florida, where they were enrolled in flight school by early July.

The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta’s actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer’s assessment of the interviewee’s knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer’s account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.

We have seen press accounts alleging that a DOD link analysis had tied Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi (who had arrived in the U.S. shortly before Atta on May 29) to two other future hijackers, Hazmi al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, in 1999-2000. No such claim was made to the Commission by any witness. Moreover, all evidence that was available to the Commission indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar were never on the East coast until 2001 and that these two pairs of future hijackers had no direct contact with each other until June 2001.

If you don't think there's a coverup or the president didn't know about 9/11 before it happened check this out:

http://www.freedomunderground.org/memoryhole/pentagon.php#Main

Read this too:
http://www.cassiopaea.org/cass/boeing.htm

I don't agree with his final assesment but he does bring up some interesting stuff.

Danny

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To help relieve everybody's anxiety concerning Kristol and Schmidt's response to Rowley's letter, I have copied it in its entirity, below. In which the author's cite and quote specific sworn testimony by agents before Congress.

Bot

PS I hope Rowley gets elected to Congress. The FBI needs somebody in Congress knowledgeable and critical of the FBI. I think she'd be an excellent watchdog.

A Response to Coleen Rowley's Letter to the Washington Post Regarding Kristol-Schmitt FISA Op-Ed

This past Saturday, the Washington Post published a letter by Coleen Rowley, former FBI Special Agent and the Chief Division Counsel for the Bureau's Minneapolis office, criticizing an editorial,"Vital Presidential Power," co-authored by Weekly Standard editor William Kristol and AEI resident scholar Gary Schmitt. The Kristol-Schmitt op-ed was a defense of President Bush's decision to by-pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in ordering NSA electronic surveillance of al Qaeda-related communications to and from the United States. Ms. Rowley, who is now running for Congress in Minnesota as a Democrat (DFL), made the following key criticism in her letter:

"... Contrary to Kristol and Schmitt's assertion that 'the Justice Department decided there was not sufficient evidence to get a FISA warrant to allow the inspection of his computer files,' no evidence of Moussaoui's suspicious flight training and ties with terrorism was presented to the Justice Department. The department was never contacted and so did not decide anything; therefore, no decision was ever made regarding the given evidence and its subsequent application to FISA standards.
That means the FISA procedures were not the reason the FBI failed to inspect Moussaoui's computer files. Rather, the FBI's failure to share and analyze intelligence sufficiently is what enabled Moussaoui to escape further investigation."

Technically, what Ms. Rowley writes is true. The Department of Justice never did make a decision about a possible FISA warrant for Moussaoui. But her point is also misleading. If the testimony of various FBI agents and headquarters officials set out in the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 by the House and Senate intelligence committees is accurate, the reason the Justice Department didn't pursue a FISA warrant was because the FBI itself refused to move forward with an application to the Justice Department. For all of the FBI's suspicions of Moussaoui, the Bureau believed there was not sufficient evidence that he was an "agent of a foreign power" or "terrorist" and, hence, the case did not in their judgment meet the "probable cause" standard required under FISA to obtain a warrant. If so, this would seem to confirm Kristol and Schmitt’s point that the “probable cause” standard required by FISA did play a central role in no FISA warrant being issued in this instance.

What follows are excerpts from the Joint Inquiry:

“Around this time, an attorney in the National Security Law Unit at FBI Headquarters asked the Chief Division Counsel in the Minneapolis field office whether she had considered trying to obtain a criminal warrant. The Chief Division Counsel replied that a FISA order would be the safer course..... (319)
At the suggestion of a Minneapolis supervisor, the agent contacted an FBI officer who had been detailed to the CTC. The agent shared the details of the Moussaoui investigation with the CTC detailee and provided the names of Moussaoui’s associates. The agent explained in a Joint Inquiry interview that he was looking for any information CTC could provide to strengthen the case linking Moussaoui to international terrorism..... (320)

On Wednesday, August 22, the FBI Legat in Paris provided a report that [ deleted ] started a series of discussions between Minneapolis and Headquarters RFU as to whether a specific group of Chechen rebels was a “recognized” foreign power, that is, was on the State Department’s list of terrorist groups and for which the FISA Court had previously granted orders.

The RFU agent told Joint Inquiry staff that, based on advice he received from the NSLU, he believed that the Chechen rebels were not a “recognized” foreign power and that, even if Moussaoui were to be linked to them, the FBI could not obtain a search order under FISA. The RFU agent told the Minneapolis agents that they had to connect Moussaoui to al-Qa’ida, which he believed was a “recognized” foreign power. (321)....

Ultimately, the RFU agent agreed to submit Minneapolis’ FISA request to attorneys in the FBI’s NSLU for review.

In interviews, several FBI attorneys with whom the RFU agent consulted confirmed that they advised the RFU agent that the evidence was insufficient to link Moussaoui to a foreign power. One of the attorneys noted that Chechen rebels were not an international foreign terrorism group under FISA (321)....

On August 27, the RFU agent told the Minneapolis supervisor that the supervisor was getting people “spun up” over Moussaoui. According to his notes and his statement to the Joint Inquiry, the supervisor replied that he was trying to get people at FBI Headquarters “spun up” because he was trying to make sure that Moussaoui “did not take control of a plane and fly it into the World Trade Center.” The Minneapolis agent said that the Headquarters agent told him:

‘[T]hat’s not going to happen. We don’t know he’s a terrorist. You don’t have enough to show he is a terrorist. You have a guy interested in this type of aircraft – that is it.’

[On August 28, the RFU agent edited, and returned to Minneapolis for comment, the request for a FISA Court order that Minneapolis had prepared. The RFU agent told the Joint Inquiry that it was not unusual for FBI Headquarters agents to make changes to field submissions. The major substantive change was removal of information that tried to make connections between the Chechen rebels and al-Qa’ida. After the edit was complete, the RFU agent briefed the FBI Deputy General Counsel, who told the Joint Inquiry that he agreed with the agent that there was insufficient information to show that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power]. (322-23)

The operations officer of "Able Danger" has Weldon as their unofficial Congressional spokesman, since he brought it up.

According to Weldon, Able Danger identified Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi as members of a cell Able Danger code-named "Brooklyn" because of some loose connections to New York City.

Weldon said that in September 2000, the unit recommended on three separate occasions that its information on the hijackers be given to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." However, Weldon said Pentagon lawyers rejected the recommendation, arguing that Atta and the others were in the country legally so information on them could not be shared with law enforcement.

"Lawyers within the administration — and we're talking about the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration — said 'you can't do it,'" and put post-its over Atta's face, Weldon said. "They said they were concerned about the political fallout that occurred after Waco ... and the Branch Davidians."

Defense Department documents show that the Able Danger team was set up in 1999 to identify potential Al Qaeda operatives for U.S. Special Operations Command. Information provided to the team by the Army's Information Dominance Center pointed to a possible Al Qaeda cell in Brooklyn.

However, because of concerns about pursuing information on "U.S. persons" — a legal term that includes U.S. citizens as well as foreigners admitted to the country for permanent residence — Special Operations Command didn't give the Army information to the FBI. It is unclear whether the Army provided the information to anyone else.

Behind the Compromise on Spying
By Massimo Calabresi LA Times

A compromise deal to extend the federal government's domestic spying powers, passed by the House on Friday and expected to sail through the Senate next week, has drawn attacks from both sides of the political spectrum. The right is unhappy at concessions made to protect civil liberties; the left is furious that the Democrats allowed the domestic spying powers to be extended in any form. Much of the latter's rage has been directed against Nancy Pelosi, the liberal House Speaker who was instrumental in negotiating the deal — attacking her on the internet and virtually shutting down her switchboard with complaints. One blogger called Pelosi "disturbingly disoriented" and said the deal she and her allies have cut will "eviscerate the Fourth Amendment, exempt their largest corporate contributors from the rule of law, and endorse the most radical aspects of the Bush lawbreaking regime."

What motivated Pelosi and the Democrats to incur the wrath of their liberal base and allow one of the Administration's most controversial anti-terror policies to be extended? A mix of politics, pragmatism and some significant concessions.

First of all, Pelosi wanted the issue off the table for the political campaign this fall. Despite anti-GOP sentiment in the country and record low popularity for President George W. Bush, Democrats still trail on national security and that could hurt them in Congress. Stonewalling the Administration and letting the surveillance powers expire could have cost the Democrats swing seats they won in 2006 as well as new ones they have a chance to steal from Republicans this November. "For any Republican-leaning district this would have been a huge issue," says a top Pelosi aide, who estimates that as many as 10 competitive races could have been affected by it.

Pelosi realized that conservative freshman Democrats like Nancy Boyda of Kansas and centrist Southern representatives were willing to squeeze the Administration for a compromise as long as she got one in the end. That made it possible for her to let the Protect America Act — which passed last August and granted full approval to the Adminstration's expansive surveillance powers — expire in February, and set up her negotiating position through the spring.

Letting the PAA expire was a risk — the Administration pilloried Democrats for being soft on terrorism. But Pelosi successfully parlayed it into specific improvements. For example, under Administration proposals, the telecoms would have received full retroactive immunity from lawsuits brought by civil libertarians alleging they violated the fourth amendment by complying with Administration requests to conduct wiretaps following 9/11. In negotiations with Pelosi's office, the telecoms offered a compromise: Let a judge decide if the letters they received from the Administration asking for their help show that the government was really after terrorist suspects and not innocent Americans.

Pelosi's negotiators felt that was a significant concession. The California district judge who will make the decision in such cases has been sympathetic to some of the civil libertarians' claims. And an adverse decision can be appealed to the liberal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The telecoms are casting it as a victory, and Pelosi's aides acknowledge the telecoms are likely to win immunity in court. But they're getting less than they would have in A Senate version of the bill, and they will hardly have a free ride once litigation and lobbying fees have been added up.

Pelosi also got other improvements, including a review of and report on Bush's domestic surveillance program by the Justice Department inspector general and a provision making clear that Congress does not give the President a free pass on complying with domestic surveillance laws during wartime. "This bill strengthens Congressional oversight," Pelosi argues.

Pelosi had another reason for backing the compromise: unlike some on the left, she actually believes domestic surveillance laws needs updating in light of the new terror threats. "We can't go without a bill," she said on the House floor Friday, "That's simply just not an option." Existing U.S. surveillance law, passed in 1978, needs to be improved, she believes, not just to protect Americans at home but to protect U.S. troops in the field. "Our troops in the field depend on timely and reliable intelligence," she said.

Pelosi's centrist compromise doesn't just help House Democrats in the fall. It also gives the party's presumptive nominee for President, Barack Obama, a chance to move to the center on national security. "Given the legitimate threats we face, providing effective intelligence collection tools with appropriate safeguards is too important to delay," Obama said in a statement Friday. "So I support the compromise."

"Sleeping With the Devil" -How Washington sold our soul for Saudi crude

Robert Baer

Available at you local Library.

'Will help illuminate this whole Effing
"War Profiteering Epoch,in American Infamy". [My Statement...My Quotes]

If 9/11 had not occurred (Bush)/Cheney would have found some way to finagle
a similar event.To use to Terrorize the American Public and the World for their
own corrupt ends.(I realize B/C are just the "Stooges" of their Financial
employers)

"We done slapped the Beehive...and ain't nobody got on any Protection"

What really makes me crazy...U.S. Armed Forces sent to prosecute a "War"
Without: Ammunition,Body Armor,Armored Vehicles,Cogent Intelligence by
the same group of un-indicted criminals that Nixon and Haldeman wouldn't
trust to take out the Garbage.(AND in direct contravention of all the plans
and advice of U.S. Central Command).These Idioti in D.C couldn't prosecute
a war against the "Three Blind Mice".

(What Jackass cannot follow that a nation that regularly indulges in extra-
territorial "Expeditions" [F**k*** with Friend and Foe alike] No Matter how
Morally correct, is bound to be on the receiving end of the stick...sooner or
LATER.)

"Terrorista", what Terrorista"?
We are checking less than 2% of the container cargo that enters the U.S.
I have great trouble sleeping soundly...Less than 12 miles from a major
U.S. Port.

...RANT...
Hell, with their track record of "Hands Off" (only after the Year of Our Lord
5015),It's a wonder IED's aren't as common in Londinum as Iraq.The British
took three different groups(Who had been happily butchering each other
since time immemorial)Sunnis,Shias and Kurds ,'Forced a "Nation".And now
wonder why it's all gone to hell?(I can hear' em now,"Where is Saddam
when we need him?")

End ...Rant...

Iraq was not "Full of Terrorists" before the second Gulf "Adventure".
Wait until the "Minders" have gone back to the West!

It now looks like we will need Israel to save us from Iran.
(Unless somebody remembers how to "Carpet Bomb" with B-52s)
Oh. Wait,That's Cindy McCain's cue...
[Can you hear the Beach Boys?...Bet that puckered some nether ends in
Tehran]

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