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#17
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- Peter.
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2021 Chevrolet Spark Formerly... 2000 GMC Sonoma 1981 240D 4spd stick. 347000 miles. Deceased Feb 14 2021 ![]() 2002 Kia Rio. Worst crap on four wheels 1981 240D 4spd stick. 389000 miles. 1984 123 200 1979 116 280S 1972 Cadillac Sedan DeVille 1971 108 280S |
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#18
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I'm getting pretty tired of the running around in circles screaming Socialism! Socialism!! Ahhh Soooociallismmmm! myself. Although it is a convenient way to avoid having to think about complexity. The universe is not doomed because the government has a temporary stake in a company.
The government bought a piece to allay the widespread economic damage GM disappearing would have. GM's failure is not nearly going to have the impact that failure of lots of financial institutions would have had. And the government's responsibility is to provide for fair markets, not to provide wealth to the status quo economy. Markets won't evolve if the government steps in to save them. Now, in the case of the financial markets, the government has provided aid without hindering evolution. I would've preferred punitive measures added that would've in fact accelerated evolution. If the temporary ownership of GM by the government does not hinder the evolution of the company and the market, then it is a paper tiger in terms of its threat to capitalism. In other words, the practice of government in the marketplace is not necessarily the monster people shouting socialism think it is. The government is responsible for our national security. You cannot separate the economy from national security. Massive financial failure is/was an absolute threat to our national security.
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#19
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But based on it's recent history, I don't see much hope. Isn't that what the communist govts did? Kept enterprises afloat that should have died off? Using that as a wedge, we can justify just about anything we want. Where do you think we can draw the line? Govt can now take over any industry it feels like taking over because it is economic and thus national security. Sure, it is a stretch NOW but who knows. Bit by bit they will creep in.
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01 Ford Excursion Powerstroke 99 E300 Turbodiesel 91 Vette with 383 motor 05 Polaris Sportsman 800 EFI 06 Polaris Sportsman 500 EFI 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Red 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Yellow 04 Tailgator 21 ft Toy Hauler 11 Harley Davidson 883 SuperLow |
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#20
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BTW what is the governments exit strategy from GM? 60 days? A few years? 30 years? GM is still going to get rid of a ton of jobs, saving a few jobs is starting to cost more than they are worth.
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2016 Corvette Stingray 2LT 1969 280SE 2023 Ram 1500 2007 Tiara 3200 |
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#21
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If the government was going to step in and keep a car company going it is ashamed they did not rescue Dusenburg and Packard. Keep in mind that Cadillacs used to be considered the "Standard of the World". Those days are long gone. This day will be a mark in history in my opinion. I quit buying new cars when they got over $10k .
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Jim |
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The guy in charge of the breakup. 31 yrs. old.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/business/01deese.html?_r=1 WASHINGTON — It is not every 31-year-old who, in a first government job, finds himself dismantling General Motors and rewriting the rules of American capitalism. Stephen Crowley/The New York Times Brian Deese, who interrupted his law school career, is the little-seen force behind the revamping of the American auto industry. But that, in short, is the job description for Brian Deese, a not-quite graduate of Yale Law School who had never set foot in an automotive assembly plant until he took on his nearly unseen role in remaking the American automotive industry. Nor, for that matter, had he given much thought to what ailed an industry that had been in decline ever since he was born. A bit laconic and looking every bit the just-out-of-graduate-school student adjusting to life in the West Wing — “he’s got this beard that appears and disappears,” says Steven Rattner, one of the leaders of President Obama’s automotive task force — Mr. Deese was thrown into the auto industry’s maelstrom as soon the election-night parties ended. “There was a time between Nov. 4 and mid-February when I was the only full-time member of the auto task force,” Mr. Deese, a special assistant to the president for economic policy, acknowledged recently as he hurried between his desk at the White House and the Treasury building next door. “It was a little scary.” But now, according to those who joined him in the middle of his crash course about the automakers’ downward spiral, he has emerged as one of the most influential voices in what may become President Obama’s biggest experiment yet in federal economic intervention. While far more prominent members of the administration are making the big decisions about Detroit, it is Mr. Deese who is often narrowing their options. A month ago, when the administration was divided over whether to support Fiat’s bid to take over much of Chrysler, it was Mr. Deese who spoke out strongly against simply letting the company go into liquidation, according to several people who were present for the debate. “Brian grasps both the economics and the politics about as quickly as I’ve seen anyone do this,” said Lawrence H. Summers, the head of the National Economic Council who is not known for being patient whenever he believes an analysis is sub-par — or disagrees with his own. “And there he was in the Roosevelt Room, speaking up vigorously to make the point that the costs we were going to incur giving Fiat a chance were no greater than some of the hidden costs of liquidation.” Mr. Deese was not the only one favoring the Fiat deal, but his lengthy memorandum on how liquidation would increase Medicaid costs, unemployment insurance and municipal bankruptcies ended the debate. The administration supported the deal, and it seems likely to become a reality on Monday, if a federal judge handling the high-speed bankruptcy proceeding approves the sale of Chrysler’s best assets to the Italian carmaker. Mr. Deese’s role is unusual for someone who is neither a formally trained economist nor a business school graduate, and who never spent much time flipping through the endless studies about the future of the American and Japanese auto industries. He lives a dual life these days. He starts the day at a desk wedged just outside of Mr. Summers’s office, where he can hear what young members of the economic team have come to know as “the Summers bellow.” From there, he can make it quickly to the press office to help devise explanations for why taxpayers are spending more than $50 billion on what polls show is a very unpopular bailout of the auto industry. Several times a day he speed-walks to Treasury, taking a shortcut through the tunnel under the colonnade, near the kitchens. The other day he talked about how sharply perceptions of the industry’s future changed after Mr. Obama’s election. “At the first meeting with Rick Wagoner,” he said, referring to G.M.’s recently deposed chief executive, “they were in a very different place. He said publicly that bankruptcy was not a viable option. It’s been a long process getting everyone to look at the options differently.” In fact, from before Inauguration Day, few in Mr. Obama’s circle saw any other choice. Every time Mr. Deese ran the numbers on G.M. and Chrysler, he came back with the now-obvious conclusion that neither was a viable business, and that their plans to revive themselves did not address the erosion of their revenues. But it took the support of Mr. Rattner and Ron Bloom, senior advisers to the task force charged with restructuring the automobile industry, to help turn Mr. Deese’s positions into policy. “The president’s instruction to us was that we had to come up with a solution that would work on a commercial basis, that didn’t involve indefinite federal financing,” Mr. Deese said. “But we didn’t want liquidation, which would have even worse effects. So the question was how do you design a very substantial restructuring, and do it fast.” Mr. Deese’s route to the auto table at the White House was anything but a straight line. He is the son of a political science professor at Boston College (his father) and an engineer who works in renewable energy (his mother). He grew up in the Boston suburb of Belmont and attended Middlebury College in Vermont. He went to Washington to work on aid issues and was quickly hired by Nancy Birdsall, a widely respected authority on the effectiveness of international aid and the founder of the Center for Global Development. But he wanted to learn domestic issues as well, and soon ended up working as an assistant for Gene Sperling, who 17 years ago in the Clinton White House played a similar role as economic policy prodigy. Eventually, Mr. Deese headed to Yale for his law degree. But his e-mail box was constantly filled with messages from friends in Washington who were signing up to work for the Obama or Hillary Rodham Clinton campaigns. Mr. Deese chose Senator Clinton’s. “He was pretty quickly functioning as the top economic policy staffer through her campaign,” Mr. Sperling said. “He could blend the policy needs and the political needs pretty seamlessly.” On the day that the Clinton campaign ended, Mr. Deese left her concession speech and received a message on his BlackBerry from a friend in the Obama campaign urging him to sign on immediately to Mr. Obama’s team. He resumed his policy work there, and found himself stuck in Chicago — unable to fly to Washington with his dog — as the economic crisis deepened. Finally, one night, he decided to get into his car with his dog and just started driving back to Washington. Tired, he pulled over to catch some sleep in the car. “I slept in the parking lot of the G. M. plant in Lordstown, Ohio,” he recalled. The giant plant, opened during G.M.’s heyday in the mid-1960s, is where the Pontiac G5 is produced. Under the plan Mr. Deese worked on when he arrived in Washington, Pontiac will disappear. “I guess that was prophetic,” he said, shaking his head. |
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A brutally honest piece by none other than Robert Reich.
Politics and social engineering, baby. Nothing more. General Motors holds a mirror up to AmericaBy Robert Reich Published: May 31 2009 21:03 | Last updated: May 31 2009 21:03 As president of General Motors when Eisenhower tapped him to become secretary of defence in 1953, “Engine Charlie” Wilson voiced at his Senate confirmation hearing what was then the conventional view. When asked whether he could make a decision in the interest of the US that was adverse to the interest of GM, he said he could. Then he reassured them that such a conflict would never arise. “I cannot conceive of one because for years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. Our company is too big. It goes with the welfare of the country.” Wilson was only slightly exaggerating. At the time, the fate of GM was inextricably linked to that of the nation. In 1953, GM was the world’s biggest manufacturer, the symbol of US economic might. It generated 3 per cent of US gross national product. GM’s expansion in the 1950s was credited with stalling a business slump. It was also America’s largest employer, paying its workers solidly middle-class wages with generous benefits. Today, Wal-Mart is America’s largest employer, Toyota is the world’s largest carmaker and General Motors is expected to file for bankruptcy. And Wilson’s reassuring words in 1953 now have an ironic twist. There will be little difference between what is good for America and for GM because it is soon to be owned by US taxpayers who have forked out more than $60bn (€42bn, £37bn) to buy it. But why would US taxpayers want to own today’s GM? Surely not because the shares promise a high return when the economy turns up. GM has been on a downward slide for years. In the 1960s, consumer advocate Ralph Nader revealed its cars were unsafe. In the 1970s, Middle East oil producers showed its cars were uneconomic. In the 1980s, Japanese carmakers exposed them as unreliable and costly. Many younger Americans have never bought a GM car and would not think of doing so. Given this record, it seems doubtful that taxpayers will even be repaid our $60bn. But getting repaid cannot be the main goal of the bail-out. Presumably, the reason is to serve some larger public purpose. But the goal is not obvious. It cannot be to preserve GM jobs, because the US Treasury has signalled GM must slim to get the cash. It plans to shut half-a-dozen factories and sack at least 20,000 more workers. It has already culled its dealership network. The purpose cannot be to create a new, lean, debt-free company that might one day turn a profit. That is what the private sector is supposed to achieve on its own and what a reorganisation under bankruptcy would do. Nor is the purpose of the bail-out to create a new generation of fuel-efficient cars. Congress has already given carmakers money to do this. Besides, the Treasury has said it has no interest in being an active investor or telling the industry what cars to make. The only practical purpose I can imagine for the bail-out is to slow the decline of GM to create enough time for its workers, suppliers, dealers and communities to adjust to its eventual demise. Yet if this is the goal, surely there are better ways to allocate $60bn than to buy GM? The funds would be better spent helping the Midwest diversify away from cars. Cash could be used to retrain car workers, giving them extended unemployment insurance as they retrain. But US politicians dare not talk openly about industrial adjustment because the public does not want to hear about it. A strong constituency wants to preserve jobs and communities as they are, regardless of the public cost. Another equally powerful group wants to let markets work their will, regardless of the short-term social costs. Polls show most Americans are against bailing out GM, but if their own jobs were at stake I am sure they would have a different view. So the Obama administration is, in effect, paying $60bn to buy off both constituencies. It is telling the first group that jobs and communities dependent on GM will be better preserved because of the bail-out, and the second that taxpayers and creditors will be rewarded by it. But it is not telling anyone the complete truth: GM will disappear, eventually. The bail-out is designed to give the economy time to reduce the social costs of the blow. ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Behind all of this is a growing public fear, of which GM’s demise is a small but telling part. Half a century ago, the prosperity of America’s middle class was one of democratic capitalism’s greatest triumphs. By the time Wilson left GM, almost half of all US families fell within the middle range of income. Most were headed not by professionals or executives but by skilled and semi-skilled factory workers. Jobs were steady and health benefits secure. Americans were becoming more equal economically. But starting three decades ago, these trends have been turned upside down. Middle-class jobs that do not need a college degree are disappearing. Job security is all but gone. And the nation is more unequal. GM in its heyday was the model of economic security and widening prosperity. Its decline has mirrored the disappearance of both. Middle-class taxpayers worry they cannot afford to bail out companies like GM. Yet they worry they cannot afford to lose their jobs. Wilson’s edict, too, has been turned upside down: in many ways, what has been bad for GM has been bad for much of America. The writer, former US labour secretary, is professor of public policy at the University of California at Berkeley. His most recent book is ‘Supercapitalism’ Last edited by dynalow; 06-01-2009 at 07:37 PM. |
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#24
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2004 VW Jetta TDI (manual) Past MB's: '96 E300D, '83 240D, '82 300D, '87 300D, '87 420SEL |
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#25
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Well, isn't true that the people who are going to be involved in this company which is way behind in it's bills is the same group that cannot balance their checkbook? If that isn't the blind leading the blind, I don't know what is. The only difference is the govt can print more money and play more shell games and use cash accounting to fool the voters while GM cannot.
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01 Ford Excursion Powerstroke 99 E300 Turbodiesel 91 Vette with 383 motor 05 Polaris Sportsman 800 EFI 06 Polaris Sportsman 500 EFI 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Red 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Yellow 04 Tailgator 21 ft Toy Hauler 11 Harley Davidson 883 SuperLow |
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#26
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2004 VW Jetta TDI (manual) Past MB's: '96 E300D, '83 240D, '82 300D, '87 300D, '87 420SEL |
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#27
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I liked the comment on the news today, might have be Robert Reich, we could have given all the workers a Million dollars.
Close the doors and come out ahead.
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KLK, MCSE 1990 500SL I was always taught to respect my elders. I don't have to respect too many people anymore. |
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#28
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I in fact do not support the government purchase of GM. I don't think the impact will be that bad. I think this is a case where the government is not acting on behalf of the nation's economic security. I think it's acting out of fear. I do not like government policies based on fear. The President, and Congress, is supposed to have the balls to lead. To make tough decisions.
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1984 300TD |
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#29
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Now what makes you think that anything has changed so that this will not be repeated?
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01 Ford Excursion Powerstroke 99 E300 Turbodiesel 91 Vette with 383 motor 05 Polaris Sportsman 800 EFI 06 Polaris Sportsman 500 EFI 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Red 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Yellow 04 Tailgator 21 ft Toy Hauler 11 Harley Davidson 883 SuperLow |
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#30
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I don't see the difference between having 60% share and 100% share. Either way, you have controlling interest. Therein lies the problem. The DON'T.
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01 Ford Excursion Powerstroke 99 E300 Turbodiesel 91 Vette with 383 motor 05 Polaris Sportsman 800 EFI 06 Polaris Sportsman 500 EFI 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Red 03 SeaDoo GTX SC Yellow 04 Tailgator 21 ft Toy Hauler 11 Harley Davidson 883 SuperLow |
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