OUCH Ya nailed me good on that one....good work! I like a good burn even if the jokes on me.

I do think you're a straight ahead guy in 9 ways out of ten.

OK, enough of that, back to our regular programming.

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Te futueo et caballum tuum

1986 300SDL, 362K
1984 300D, 138K

One thing about Black Hawk Down that separates it from almost all military documentaries: it was well researched, the Army, Army Rangers, Army 10th Mountain commanders gave the almost full blessing to the soldiers to tell the story because unlike other documentaries the Army Rangers want it immortalized because it was truly a triumphant moment it may seem different to others but there was a lot of ass kickin going on despite grim odds of survival.

Read the book Battle of Mogadishu, ***** I'll mail ya an autographed copy...you pay the postage.

^^^^ Also, it isn't attempting to derive a preconceived conclusion from a selected set of circumstances -- a definition of propaganda. Instead, it takes a narrative form from the point of view of the participants to a particular action. There is a vague allusion to the weakness of the decision-making process but no overt political motive driving it. IMO. If there had been, then Geo Bush I and especially Bill Clinton would have been severely skewered and harshly roasted. As they both deserved. IMO.

B

I do agree to an extent, to Clinton's credit there was a friggin ton of firepower and supplies there to accomplish the mission, what I disagree with is the mission was never accomplished due to tuck tail and run despite that ass kicking that was well deserved.

What happened in Somalia was exactly what Gen Powell feared -- mission creep. We started-out on a humanitarian mission with a sharply focused objective. As time passed the objectives expanded -- mostly under Bush Sr. When Clinton came in his Sec Defense, Les Aspin, continued the expanded initiatives but denied the request from the military for armor in support of the expanded mission. Instead, he relied on foreign forces under UN command. This is the extremely hazardous phenomenon known as a divided command which often results in lots of dead soldiers.

The US forces could not order armored support from the UN forces but instead, had to request them and provide details of the operations and hope that the UN would accede to the requests and do so at a time and disposition of forces useful to the US command. Recall that the US command was composed of extremely motivated, highly trained professional soldiers. They trained with regular US forces who, though not as trained or motivated, were nonetheless among the finest regular army forces in the world. In contrast, the UN forces were poorly equipped, poorly led, and unmotivated. A horrible match-up.

So on paper, Les Aspin was right -- it made sense to rely on the coalition partners since they had the type of armor that our forces needed. Unfortunately, Les Aspin was more attuned to the international political relations than to the lives of the men under his authority. The result was terrible, if somewhat predictable.

One think that came clear in that movie and in interviews that I saw on "The History Channel" was that the American forces were extraordinary men and ferocious soldiers ably led by a cohesive cadre of NCO's and officers. It was not they who were lost the battle in Mogadishu, it was the f**king American politicians. A familiar pattern.

B

^^^^Politicians ignoramus.

One thing that the books /channels also ignore were the constant mortaring of the Army and UN bases. One Delta Soldier that did survive the battle died two days later from a random mortar due to the cease fire while the pol's scratches their ass's.

Black Hawk Down was a great book because it doesn't make any kind of conclusion. It's an example of how planning cannot overcome circumstance, and that you can't take human decision making out of the equation.
There was also a fantastic Frontline (I think. A doc. on PBS at any rate) about the events, with interivews of the soldiers.

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1984 300TD

Hey, that's a heck of an offer! You're on. I'll e-mail you later, it's late now.

I read Mark Bowden's newspaper series on it back in what, '97 or '98? Pretty spellbinding story.

It's hard to say at this point how much any of the Nam films were accurate or to what degree anyway. It's almost surreal to hear "W" talking about "revisionism" regarding that episode as he's heavey into revising himself, IMO.

It was interesting to hear Peragro here assert that the infamous statement "we had to destroy the village in order to save it" was just made up by Arnett when there is so much evidence that many villages were destroyed, for some reason or another.

Grand-daddy of modern conservatism, Goldwater, had a plan to destroy large chunks of the country in order to save it. It's a tough one -- people gonna be arguing about that one up til and on their death beds.

__________________
Te futueo et caballum tuum

1986 300SDL, 362K
1984 300D, 138K

Back to Mogadishu, I always wondered about the guy who missed the rope while swinging out of the chopper. I assume Bowden's account was correct about his falling and how his injury sorta began the snowball of events to some degree.

That would be hard to live with, I'm guessing. I beat myself up over far more minor mistakes.

(can you believe I haven't seen the movie yet? I've wanted to for years, I'll have to get it at the library)

__________________
Te futueo et caballum tuum

1986 300SDL, 362K
1984 300D, 138K

Things start to snowball at the planning stage.

I still owe B a copy as well.

My fellow Jew, Peragro, didn't suggest in any way that villages were not destroyed: He said Arnett made-up that infamous line about destroying it to save it.

I could never figure that line out, there is nothing of value to destroy in Somalia. I've felt worse about knocking over a sand castle.

Soldiering is a brutal line of work. A mistake by a noncom in action can mean death to scores of people. A mistake by a general officer can mean hundreds or thousands dead. A mistake by a civilian leader can be far, far worse. But so can failure to act result in even more death, destruction, loss and misery. The American military trains it's people to take risk and responsibility at the lowest level of decision. This results in a very dynamic, responsive force. It can also result in awful mistakes. Placing decision-making power into the hands of 20-somethings is a huge risk, especially given the available ordnance. It's a tough balance.

Compare the American military's philosophy with a top-down military, say the USSR. There is no question that the USSR destroyed the German army in WWII (the Wermacht at that time was also strictly top-down). The Soviet army was victorious but at a staggering cost of life and limb. The WWII Wermacht was probably the finest army of it's kind ever to be seen on the planet. In comparison, the allied forces were quite stingy in their attitudes toward soldier's lives and living conditions. The Germans (and Soviets and Imperial Japanese) command interpreted that as weakness and even cowardice in the face of war. And so does Bin Laden.

B