how about what slick willy did for 8 years......on top of what Bush I did....and what W tried....that totals 12 years of trying OTHER things...of course democrats would preffer the "let him die of old age before we lift a finger" sort of thing....but since that never works. Or are you admitting YOUR party actually did nothing for 8 years?

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"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you." - Friedrich Nietzsche

You used the term "inevitable..." (#24) in a way that suggested to me that you entertained the idea. I agree with you that it was most certainly not inevitable.

I have no idea whether there were alternatives or not. I don't even know whether the logical argument I constructed previously is what the Administration thought, I just suggested it as one plausible argument from a constellation of possibilities. As I have said MANY times before, I never bought into any of those rationales for war that the administration put forward but I do support it for my own reasons. etc.

B

No. Saddam was well contained during the Clinton years. The problem with the approach taken during the 1990's was that it punished the common people of Iraq and couldn't be sustained. The approach was effective at containment, but needed to be modified to carry on into the future. That's where imaginative leaders would come in handy. Too bad we haven't had any of those for the last 5 years.

You must have missed the "if" in my previous post. That'll happen.That's fair. We can agree to disagree about that.

You call Bribing the UN being contained? You call violating nearly every term of the cease fire agreement contained? You call his continuing mass murder contained? Hell the last administration let the sadistic SOB do any damn thing he wanted...thats not being contained.

__________________
Proud owner of ....
1971 280SE W108
1979 300SD W116
1983 300D W123
1975 Ironhead Sportster chopper
1987 GMC 3/4 ton 4X4 Diesel
1989 Honda Civic (Heavily modified)
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Section 609 MVAC Certified
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"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you." - Friedrich Nietzsche

I can't really comment on that because I haven't taken the time to sort out fact from fiction on it. But I don't see how any bribes caused him to be uncontained.Well, yes, especially since he got punished by our planes on a regular basis. He tried to thumb his nose at us, but he was contained in the sense that he was never a threat (with emphasis on the word "never").The really big mass murder, the gassing of the Kurds, came before most people had even heard of Bill Clinton.Simply not true. Saddam's regime was a shell by the time Bill Clinton was done with him.

lot of mass graves are post 1992..........

he was paying half the UN to run interfeerance for him....he was not being contained he was doiing everything he wanted when he wanted.


You can't be serious that you think the oil for food bribery scandle was fiction....

exactly what did Bill Clinton do in his 8 years to enforce the cease fire agreements? wasn't a whole lot....was like watching the three stooges playing bonk the parrarie dog....

__________________
Proud owner of ....
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"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you." - Friedrich Nietzsche

Is this thread about "these tapes?"

Brian Ross "Completely Aware" of WMD Context
So why weren't ABC viewers allowed to know?

3/3/06

Two recent reports on ABC raised the possibility that 10-year-old tapes of Saddam Hussein might show that he "did hide weapons of mass destruction"--giving the White House's rationale for the March 2003 invasion a boost.

But as a February 17 FAIR action alert pointed out, ABC's reporting omitted evidence that undermined this argument. The tapes seem to show Hussein Kamel, Iraq's weapons chief at the time, talking about information about weapons programs that Iraq had concealed from U.N. inspectors. But when Kamel defected--soon after these tapes were recorded--he not only told CIA and U.N. investigators about this concealment, he at the same time insisted that Iraq had destroyed all its unconventional weapons stockpiles. FAIR's alert questioned why ABC failed to inform its viewers about this key information.

Responding to a query from FAIR about whether ABC was aware of the Kamel story, ABC reporter Brian Ross wrote:

"Completely aware of it of course. We felt the tapes stand for themselves."

This admission is puzzling, to say the least. How could a news outlet raise the possibility that Kamel's comments on the tapes could bolster the argument that Iraq had hidden weapons of mass destruction, and not mention that he had repeatedly told the U.S. and U.N. that Iraq had destroyed all of those weapons?

And far from letting the tapes stand for themselves, ABC provided comments from sources to help viewers interpret Kamel's recorded remarks--even though, in light of Kamel's later statements, some of those comments seem to be inaccurate. For example, ABC viewers heard from Rep. Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.), who said, based on the tapes, "You would think that it's pretty likely that there were WMD that were hidden or that were moved out of the country." If ABC knew about Kamel's later insistence that Iraq destroyed its WMDs, that means the network had compelling information to suggest that Hoekstra's interpretation was wrong.

Instead of reporting that, ABC's Nightline segment concluded that the tapes might "help both sides bolster their arguments." It's difficult to have any kind of rational argument when crucial information is kept out of the discussion.

Wow, a news organization sensationalized a report. Somebody write that down.

B

The whole thing is preposterous anyway. Those tapes don't tell us anything we didn't already know, do they? Are there really people out there who deny that Saddam used to have WMD? Who cares what he had in 1996? What matters is what he had when we invaded EIGHT YEARS LATER. EIGHT YEARS! For ABC, or anyone, to suggest that these tapes bolster Bush's position is sad. It shows that "Fair and Balanced" means to present both sides of every argument no matter how ludicrous those arguments might be.

His report to the UN said he had them....he had used them before several times adn no proof of destructions was ever subbmitted...the burden of proof was on Saddams back to make or not..not ours. And he faild to prove he got rid of them. For all you can prove they are burried under the hundreds of thousands of square miles of sand nobody has dug up yet.

__________________
Proud owner of ....
1971 280SE W108
1979 300SD W116
1983 300D W123
1975 Ironhead Sportster chopper
1987 GMC 3/4 ton 4X4 Diesel
1989 Honda Civic (Heavily modified)
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Section 609 MVAC Certified
---------------------
"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you." - Friedrich Nietzsche

Foreign Affairs
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Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside
By Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006
Summary: A special, double-length article from the upcoming May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, presenting key excerpts from the recently declassified book-length report of the USJFCOM Iraqi Perspectives Project.

Kevin Woods is a defense analyst in Washington, D.C. James Lacey is a military analyst for the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Williamson Murray is Class of 1957 Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy. Along with Mark Stout and Michael Pease, they were the principal participants in the USJFCOM Iraqi Perspectives Project.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The fall of Baghdad in April 2003 opened one of the most secretive and brutal governments in history to outside scrutiny. For the first time since the end of World War II, American analysts did not have to guess what had happened on the other side of a conflict but could actually read the defeated enemy's documents and interrogate its leading figures. To make the most of this unique opportunity, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) commissioned a comprehensive study of the inner workings and behavior of Saddam Hussein's regime based on previously inaccessible primary sources. Drawing on interviews with dozens of captured senior Iraqi military and political leaders and hundreds of thousands of official Iraqi documents (hundreds of them fully translated), this two-year project has changed our understanding of the war from the ground up. The study was partially declassified in late February; its key findings are presented here.

THROUGHOUT THE YEARS of relative external peace for Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, in 1991, Saddam Hussein continued to receive and give credence to optimistic assessments of his regime's prospects dished up by his top military officers. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz described the dictator as having been "very confident" that the United States would not dare to attack Iraq, and that if it did, it would be defeated. What was the source of Saddam's confidence?

Judging from his private statements, the single most important element in Saddam's strategic calculus was his faith that France and Russia would prevent an invasion by the United States. According to Aziz, Saddam's confidence was firmly rooted in his belief in the nexus between the economic interests of France and Russia and his own strategic goals: "France and Russia each secured millions of dollars worth of trade and service contracts in Iraq, with the implied understanding that their political posture with regard to sanctions on Iraq would be pro-Iraqi. In addition, the French wanted sanctions lifted to safeguard their trade and service contracts in Iraq. Moreover, they wanted to prove their importance in the world as members of the Security Council -- that they could use their veto to show they still had power."

Ibrahim Ahmad Abd al-Sattar, the Iraqi army and armed forces chief of staff, claimed that Saddam believed that even if his international supporters failed him and the United States did launch a ground invasion, Washington would rapidly bow to international pressure to halt the war. According to his personal interpreter, Saddam also thought his "superior" forces would put up "a heroic resistance and . . . inflict such enormous losses on the Americans that they would stop their advance." Saddam remained convinced that, in his own words, "Iraq will not, in any way, be like Afghanistan. We will not let the war become a picnic for the American or the British soldiers. No way!"

When the coalition assault did come, Saddam stubbornly clung to the belief that the Americans would be satisfied with an outcome short of regime change. According to Sattar, "No Iraqi leaders had believed coalition forces would ever reach Baghdad." Saddam's conviction that his regime would survive the war was the primary reason he did not have his forces torch Iraq's oil fields or open the dams to flood the south, moves many analysts predicted would be among Iraq's first in the event of an invasion. In the words of Aziz, "[Saddam] thought that this war would not lead to this ending." Saddam realized that if his strategic calculus was correct, he would need the oil to prop up the regime. Even with U.S. tanks crossing the Iraqi border, an internal revolt remained Saddam's biggest fear. In order to quell any postwar revolt, he would need the bridges to remain intact and the land in the south to remain unflooded. On this basis, Saddam planned his moves.

Some senior Iraqi military officers did not share their leader's assumptions, taking a more pessimistic view. The director of military intelligence, Zuhayr Talib Abd al-Sattar al-Naqib, commented that except for Saddam and the inner circle, most knowledgeable Iraqis secretly believed that the war would continue all the way to an occupation. The commander of the First Republican Guard Corps admitted, "There was nothing that could have been done to stop the Americans after they began." Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Tai, the minister of defense, recalled that "Iraqi military professionals were not surprised at U.S. actions at all. We knew what preparations were required, and what would happen if those preparations were not done properly. . . . Even if we had a real defense, we wouldn't have stopped the Americans, but we would have made the price exaggerated."

As late as the end of March 2003, Saddam apparently still believed that the war was going the way he had expected. If Iraq was not actually winning it, neither was it losing -- or at least so it seemed to the dictator. Americans may have listened with amusement to the seemingly obvious fabrications of Muhammad Said al-Sahaf, Iraq's information minister (nicknamed "Baghdad Bob" by the media). But the evidence now clearly shows that Saddam and those around him believed virtually every word issued by their own propaganda machine.

For example, during the first ten days of the war, Iraq asked Russia, France, and China not to support cease-fire initiatives because Saddam believed such moves would legitimize the coalition's presence in Iraq. As late as March 30, Saddam thought that his strategy was working and that the coalition offensive was grinding to a halt. On that day, Lieutenant General Abed Hamid Mahmoud, Saddam's principal secretary, directed the Iraqi foreign minister to tell the French and Russian governments that Baghdad would accept only an "unconditional withdrawal" of U.S. forces because "Iraq is now winning and . . . the United States has sunk in the mud of defeat." At that moment, U.S. tanks were a hundred miles south of Baghdad, refueling and rearming for the final push.

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

By 2003, the Iraqi military was reeling from 13 years of almost continuous engagement with U.S. and British air forces, the accumulating effects of sanctions, and the insidious impact of the regime's dysfunctional policies. These pressures had all helped drive the Iraqi military into a state of chronic decline. The Iraqi military's main mission was to ensure the internal security of the Baathist dictatorship. Concerned about everything except fighting wars, the Iraqi military, which had once aspired to a Western-like profession of arms, became focused on militarily irrelevant -- but nonetheless life-and-death -- issues.

The best example of this focus is the prewar condition of the Iraqi air force, which did not launch a single sortie against the coalition during the invasion. According to the commander of Iraq's air force and air defense force, Hamid Raja Shalah, Saddam simply decided two months before the war that the air force would not participate. Apparently, Saddam reasoned that the quality and quantity of the Iraqi air force's equipment would make it worse than useless against coalition air forces. Consequently, he decided to save the air force for future needs and ordered his commanders to hide their aircraft. This decision was yet another indication that Saddam did not believe coalition ground forces would ever reach into the heart of Iraq. He was sure his regime would survive whatever conflict ensued.

To implement Saddam's decision to preserve the air force, the Iraqis moved most of their aircraft away from operational airfields. To hide them from prowling coalition air forces, they camouflaged planes in palm groves or buried them in the sand, from which coalition forces dug them up after the war. Saddam's refusal to use the Iraqi air force is reminiscent of his behavior during Desert Storm, when he ordered a significant portion of the air force to flee to Iran. In 2003, Saddam ruled out Iranian sanctuary, telling aides, "The Iranians are even stronger than before; they now have [part of] our air force." Even with his regime under dire threat, Saddam's thoughts were never far from the regional power balance.

More

When it came to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Saddam attempted to convince one audience that they were gone while simultaneously convincing another that Iraq still had them. Coming clean about WMD and using full compliance with inspections to escape from sanctions would have been his best course of action for the long run. Saddam, however, found it impossible to abandon the illusion of having WMD, especially since it played so well in the Arab world.

Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as "Chemical Ali" for his use of chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in 1987, was convinced Iraq no longer possessed WMD but claims that many within Iraq's ruling circle never stopped believing that the weapons still existed. Even at the highest echelons of the regime, when it came to WMD there was always some element of doubt about the truth. According to Chemical Ali, Saddam was asked about the weapons during a meeting with members of the Revolutionary Command Council. He replied that Iraq did not have WMD but flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary, going on to explain that such a declaration might encourage the Israelis to attack. [See Footnote #1 below]



By late 2002, Saddam finally tilted toward trying to persuade the international community that Iraq was cooperating with the inspectors of UNSCOM (the UN Special Commission) and that it no longer had WMD programs. As 2002 drew to a close, his regime worked hard to counter anything that might be seen as supporting the coalition's assertion that WMD still remained in Iraq. Saddam was insistent that Iraq would give full access to UN inspectors "in order not to give President Bush any excuses to start a war." But after years of purposeful obfuscation, it was difficult to convince anyone that Iraq was not once again being economical with the truth.

Ironically, it now appears that some of the actions resulting from Saddam's new policy of cooperation actually helped solidify the coalition's case for war. Over the years, Western intelligence services had obtained many internal Iraqi communications, among them a 1996 memorandum from the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service directing all subordinates to "insure that there is no equipment, materials, research, studies, or books related to manufacturing of the prohibited weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear, and missiles) in your site." And when UN inspectors went to these research and storage locations, they inevitably discovered lingering evidence of WMD-related programs.

In 2002, therefore, when the United States intercepted a message between two Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commanders discussing the removal of the words "nerve agents" from "the wireless instructions," or learned of instructions to "search the area surrounding the headquarters camp and [the unit] for any chemical agents, make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it," U.S. analysts viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit. They had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime's attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions.

What was meant to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it. The tidbit about removing the term "nerve agents" from radio instructions was prominently cited as an example of Iraqi bad faith by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his February 5, 2003, statement to the UN.

Another factor reduced Iraq's military effectiveness: sanctions. For more than a dozen years, UN sanctions had frayed the fiber of the Iraqi military by making it difficult for Baghdad to purchase new equipment, procure spare parts, or fund adequate training. Attempts to overcome the effects of the sanctions led Saddam to create the Military Industrial Commission as a means to sustain the military. The commission and a series of subordinate organizations steadily promised new capabilities to offset the effects of poor training, poor morale, and neglected equipment. Saddam apparently waited for the delivery of wonder weapons that would reverse the erosion of his military strength.

A captured Military Industrial Commission annual report of investments made in 2002Ð3 showed more than 170 research projects with an estimated budget of about 1.5 percent of Iraq's gdp. The commission divided projects among areas such as equipment, engineering, missiles, electronics, strategic weapons, artillery, and air forces. One senior Iraqi official alleged that the commission's leaders were so fearful of Saddam that when he ordered them to initiate weapons programs that they knew Iraq could not develop, they told him they could accomplish the projects with ease. Later, when Saddam asked for updates on the nonexistent projects, they simply faked plans and designs to show progress.

This constant stream of false reporting undoubtedly accounts for why many of Saddam's calculations on operational, strategic, and political issues made perfect sense to him. According to Aziz, "The people in the Military Industrial Commission were liars. They lied to you, and they lied to Saddam. They were always saying that they were producing or procuring special weapons so that they could get favors out of Saddam -- money, cars, everything -- but they were liars. If they did all of this business and brought in all of these secret weapons, why didn't [the weapons] work?"

Members of the Military Industrial Commission were not the only liars. Bending the truth was particularly common among the most trusted members of Saddam's inner circle -- especially when negative news might reflect poorly on the teller's abilities or reputation. According to one former high-ranking Baath Party official, "Saddam had an idea about Iraq's conventional and potential unconventional capabilities, but never an accurate one because of the extensive lying occurring in that area. Many reports were falsified. The ministers attempted to convey a positive perspective with reports, which were forwarded to Saddam's secretary, who in turn passed them up to Saddam." In the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom, everyone around Saddam understood that his need to hear only good news was constantly growing and that it was in their best interest to feed that hunger.

A 1982 incident vividly illustrated the danger of telling Saddam what he did not want to hear. At one low point during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam asked his ministers for candid advice. With some temerity, the minister of health, Riyadh Ibrahim, suggested that Saddam temporarily step down and resume the presidency after peace was established. Saddam had him carted away immediately. The next day, pieces of the minister's chopped-up body were delivered to his wife. According to Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh, the head of the Military Industrial Commission and a relative of the murdered minister, "This powerfully concentrated the attention of the other ministers, who were unanimous in their insistence that Saddam remain in power."

Within the Iraqi military and the Iraqi regime more generally, rumors circulated that summary execution awaited anyone who dared contradict the dictator. Officers remembered the story of the brigadier general who once spent over a year in prison for daring to suggest that U.S. tanks might be superior to those of the Iraqi army. One senior minister noted, "Directly disagreeing with Saddam Hussein's ideas was unforgivable. It would be suicide." Nor was Saddam alone in his distaste for bad news. According to Major General Hamid Ismail Dawish al-Rubai, the director general of the Republican Guard's general staff, "Any commander who spoke the truth to [Saddam's son] Qusay would lose his head."

Fear of Saddam's reaction to bad news was not limited to his ministers and soldiers. Its pernicious effects reached even into Saddam's immediate family. One former high-level official related the following story about Qusay:

At the end of 2000, it came to Saddam's attention that approximately seventy military vehicles were immobile. Saddam told Qusay to resolve the problem. Republican Guard mechanics claimed they could repair the vehicles if the funds were made available. Qusay agreed to the work, and funds were provided for the task. Once the work was completed, Qusay sent a representative to inspect the vehicles and he found them lined up on a vehicle park, thirty-five vehicles on each side. The vehicles looked like new, having been freshly painted and cleaned.

After Qusay's representative inspected them, a second inspection was conducted to verify that they were now operational. The staff was told to supply drivers to move all [the] vehicles to the opposite side of the vehicle park to ensure they were in working order. None of the seventy vehicles would start. When this was reported to Qusay, he instructed that Saddam not be informed, as Qusay had already told Saddam that the vehicles were operational.


More at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/

I keep wondering when are we going to realize that Saddam himself WAS A WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION! He killed thousands of his own country men and dreamed of killing millions of us. Thank God the United Nations was in country to supervise his efforts with very sternly worded threats of future action. We should have invaded the UN at the same time.

I oppose war in general, therefore I oppose this one. I would have sent a sniper team and tried the one bullet method first, then one missle, then gone full scale.....but that's just me, I'm cheap.

What really gets to me is the opportunity Saddam through his insanity let slip through his fingers. He had a oil for food program set in place by the good old United Nations. Saddam could have "repented" and used that program to make his country a true Paradise on Earth for his people. The money could have been used for food, health care, education and none of it wasted on war machines.

He could have been the greatest leader of the decade, instead he wound up in a hole in the ground (he would still be in the same hole if I had found him). There is fine line between hero and *****head.

__________________
Mark
1983 300TD Wagon
Even a broken watch is right twice a day

Some thoughts -

1. How many Iraqis did Hussein actually kill after the first Gulf War? I'm thinking not many. After that war he didn't have control of 2/3 of his country due to no-fly zones, and after we invaded we discovered his subordinates would simply nod 'yes' when given orders but would not necessarily carry them out.

Of the roughly 1 million people he is thought to have killed, I'll bet the vast, vast majority were pre-Gulf War. And yes, I do know about the Shia who were killed when they rose up after the Gulf War.

2. Chemical and biological weapons require maintenance. If you have such weapons and store them somewhere for 8 years, they are not, according to what I've read, going to be functional anymore if you haven't done anything to maintain them. There was no evidence Iraqis had maintained their weapons, which was why a former cabinet member of Tony Blair's stated one week after the 2003 invasion that no WMD's would be found.

3. People from all countries were paying kickbacks to make money in Iraq. Americans have been presecuted for this and there is currently a huge scandal in Australia regarding kickback payments AWB made to Hussein. By the way, an article in today's Sydney Morning Herald states that the Aussie prime minister was alerted to these kickbacks 5 years ago. People in France, Russia, and at the UN were not the only ones benefitting from Hussein's abuse of the oil for food program. Some countries that benfitted significantly from this were in favor of the invasion.

4. Our reasoning for the invasion was certainly not humanitarian, and I don't think you can justify it that way. If we were interested in the humanitarian aspect then why don't we take a more proactive stance on what's happenning ni Darfur? Why don't we invade the Congo, where more people have died in the last several decades than in Iraq?

I also don't think you can ignore the fact that our support for Hussein and for Mobutu Sese Seko (who created much of the Congo mess) was part of the reason they were able to do such terrible things to their people. When we (Americans) say we invaded Iraq to 'liberate' the Iraqi people we sound like hypocrites. We supported the guy we 'liberated' them from for decades!

And finally, I can see why the world would question our stated desire to foster 'democracy' around the world (we are a republic and not a democracy, fyi) when our post WWII policy has always been to support dictators, as they were more unlikely than elected bodies to turn commie on us. Iraq is a good example of this but the Congo is a better one.

I really do believe W when he says he wants to foster 'democracy,' however, and it's one of the few things I admire about him.

__________________
Ralph

1985 300D Turbo, CA model
248,650 miles and counting...